Dispute Settlement at the WTO and the Dole Commission: USTR Resources and Success

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Abstract

Circumstances surrounding the approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements in the US Congress has focused attention on USTR performance at the WTO. Having more resources may have an ambiguous impact on the USTR’s rate of success at the WTO. This can be true even when explicit allowance is made for reactions by the other party to the dispute and for situations where case vary in importance to both parties. More resources cannot explain the increased use the USTR has made of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism since the establishment of the WTO. Rather a more predictable DSM may have encouraged more rather than fewer cases to be brought to the WTO.

I. The Passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements and the Dole Commission

After more than seven years of negotiation the Uruguay Round concluded with an historic agreement on December 15th, 1993. Exactly four months later documents implementing this agreement were signed by representatives of the 117 Uruguay Round participants at a ministerial meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco. Even so, this signed agreement required ratification at home by the relevant legislative bodies of the agreement signatories.

* The first four sections of this paper rely on the research assistance of Chan Ho Song. Rodney Wallace helped formulate Sections V and VI and Joel Sobel Section VII. None of them are to blame for the context within which their insights and analysis have been used.
Ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreements was viewed as virtually certain in all countries except the United States. While the new World Trade Organization was set to begin operations January 1, 1995, as late as October, 1994, Senate Finance Committee Chair, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, could claim only twenty-six committed yes votes. Many senators, including the Republican Minority Leader, Robert Dole, were said to be concerned about the WTO’s newly enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The critical element of the revised DSM is the absence of the right of any country acting alone to block the formation of a Dispute Settlement panel or the adoption of panel findings. As the DSM had operated under the GATT, veto power was held, effectively, even by the accused party. In fact, this power was used in significant instances by losing parties to block adverse panel findings against them. Under the WTO, panels get set up and proceed with their investigations and panel findings get adopted unless the WTO Council decides otherwise by consensus. This is the polar opposite of the older *modus operandi*, and it was the loss of national sovereignty implicit in this new arrangement to which many senators objected.

That there should have been Congressional objections to the new DSM is ironic. In the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act that gave the Reagan Administration fast-track authority for

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the Uruguay Round, Congress mandated US trade officials “to negotiate for more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism and procedures” that would “enable better enforcement of US rights.” Actually, the inclusion of such language in the Trade Act of 1988 should be no surprise. US interest in a revised DSM is of very long standing. Already during the Tokyo Round, the United States pressed both for an end to the single country veto and for expedited procedures.

In Fall, 1994, populist fears about the loss of sovereignty to the WTO were such that Senator Dole reported that his office was receiving 2000 phone calls a day from opponents of the Uruguay Round Agreement. Notwithstanding, on November 23rd, 1994, he agreed to support the enabling legislation and to encourage all Republican senators to support it in exchange for White House support for a Dole-conceived WTO “escape hatch.” The “escape hatch” would be embodied in legislation to be introduced the following year that would establish a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission. Dole intended that


7 The establishment of such review commission as a by-product of the passage of controversial legislation is not unprecedented. The Spring 2000 discussion of a joint White House Congressional commission with powers to review human rights, labor policies and development of the rule of law in China in connection with legislation to grant China permanent Most-Favored Nation status is just the latest instance of the use of this device.
• The Commission would consist of five Federal appellate judges appointed by the President in consultation with the leadership of both Houses and Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Ways and Means Committees.

• It would review all final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the agreement. Following issuance of any affirmative determination by the Commission any member of either House would be able to introduce a joint resolution calling on the President to negotiate new dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the problem.

• If there were three affirmative determinations in any five-year period, any member of either House could introduce a joint resolution to disapprove U.S. participation in the WTO – and if the resolution were enacted by Congress and signed by the President, the United States would commence withdrawal from the WTO.

II. The History of the Dole Commission

Despite the wide-spread publicity given the Clinton-Dole WTO agreement and despite the Senate having passed the WTO implementing legislation on December 1, 1994, in the almost six years that have ensued, the so-called “Dole Commission” has not been set up. As early as January 4th, 1995, on the very first day of the new Congress, with Republicans in control of both Houses for the first time in forty years, Senator Dole

introduced legislation creating the Commission. The bill was identical with the terms of the late November agreement with the exception of one significant provision. Section 7 of the proposed legislation would have guaranteed participation by private parties in the proceedings before the dispute settlement panels.

Guaranteeing participation of private parties in dispute settlement panel proceedings, while it did not deter many of the Senate’s leading figures on trade policy from co-sponsoring the bill, including Senators Moynihan, Baucus, D’Amato, Grassley, Murkowski, Lott, Pressler, Santorum and Simon, was as controversial in 1995 as it is today. The hearings held by the Senate Finance Committee on the Dole legislation found wide disagreement on this issue between two former Deputy United State Trade Representatives. Alan Wolff argued such private participation was necessary because

….. even the best lawyer cannot do a first-rate job if he or she does not have the time or resources to devote to a case. The reality is that these very capable people at USTR are already overworked and if the WTO system spawns even more international trade litigation before panels, they will be stretched even thinner … The result is that the United States will lose cases it should win.

Alan Holmer countered that

… in dispute settlement, the US Government needs to be able to act efficiently and speak with one voice. This is not a mere theoretical issue. Some WTO cases will involve issues that have a direct economic impact on dozens of US industries, trade associations, or companies. Will each of them have the right to represent the interests of the United States before the panel? What if, while supporting the overall U.S. government position, their

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8 Congressional Record Senate Volume 141 No. 1, January 4, 1995.


view of the law or the facts is different from that of the USG? Moreover, inevitably there will be differences in strategic approaches to cases, particularly where the best US legal argument in one case may have a detrimental interest in another case. The role of the Administration in dispute settlement proceedings is not to represent one company or interest group. Rather, its role is to represent the national interest.\textsuperscript{11}

The Clinton Administration took Ambassador Holmer’s side in this dispute and refused to support the legislation as Senator Dole had submitted it.\textsuperscript{12} It was only the following November that the original Dole legislation was re-introduced, this time with offending Section 7 removed.\textsuperscript{13} In his eagerness to have this legislation passed prior to the beginning of the 1996 presidential primaries in which he would be a candidate and in which he would face protectionist opposition, Senator Dole agreed to allow Robert Byrd, a very senior Democratic member of the Senate, to submit an amendment that would set up two new WTO review commissions in addition to the one comprised of members of the Federal judiciary. One commission would consist of senators whose mandate would be to review all aspects of the WTO’s workings and to recommend legislation wherever appropriate. This commission of senators would be advised by a second commission comprised of trade lawyers, former government officials, scholars and labor leaders.\textsuperscript{14}

The Byrd Amendment doomed the Dole legislation. Key members of the Senate Finance Committee, led by its Chair, William Roth, changed their views and now opposed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Alan Wm. Wolff and John A. Ragosta, “How the Uruguay Round Will Change the Practice of International Trade Law in the United States” (July, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{13} United States Senate Bill No. 1438, 104\textsuperscript{th} Congress (November 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{14} John Maggs, “Dole Makes Another Push for WTO Oversight Bill,” \textit{Journal of Commerce}, December 6, 1995. p. 3A.
\end{itemize}
the Dole proposal fearing first that the new commission of senators would be a threat to the Finance Committee’s jurisdiction over trade issues, and, second, that the private sector commission would be prone to domination by special interests.\textsuperscript{15} This latter concern was also shared by the Clinton Administration. One last attempt was made to pass this legislation during the last few days before Senator Dole’s resignation from the Senate. A compromise was reached to drop the new commission of senators and to refashion the private sector commission so that 1) half the nominees would be appointed by the White House and 2) the new commission would report directly to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways & Means Committee.\textsuperscript{16} Notwithstanding this compromise, opposition from protectionist textile interests, who were hostile to anything that might legitimize the WTO in any way, was sufficient to prevent the legislation from coming to a vote at that time.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, while periodically re-introduced, the legislation was not voted on in that Congress at all, nor in any subsequent Congress since that time.\textsuperscript{18}

III. Congressional Review of WTO Treatment of US Interests

\textsuperscript{15} John Maggs, “Dole Unlikely to Pass WTO Bill in ’95,” \textit{Journal of Commerce}.


\textsuperscript{17} John Maggs, “Dole Gives Bill Final Push,” \textit{Journal of Commerce}, June 12, 1996, p. 3A.

\textsuperscript{18} See, for example, House of Representatives Bill No. 2612, 106\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, July 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1999. This particular proposed legislation has still more controversial provisions than the original Dole legislation, including a section that would abolish the United States International Trade Commission. There appears to be little chance of its passage in this Congress.
While the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Act has never been passed by Congress and does not have any immediate prospect of passage, the sovereignty issues raised at the time it was under active consideration remain politically salient. There may be no federal judiciary review of WTO decisions adverse to US interests, but the Uruguay Round Agreements Act does require a five year review for the Congress by the USTR of US participation in the WTO. This report appeared in late February of this year. By the USTR’s count, to date, 32 cases in which the United States has been involved in a significant way have been completed at the WTO. Of these cases, the United States has prevailed in 24, either as a result of a Dispute Settlement panel finding or because of a settlement highly favorable to US interests prior to a formal panel report being issued. The USTR, emphasizing both the large number of cases in which the United States has prevailed, particularly as a plaintiff, and the overall high win-rate, concludes that the DSM has operated in a way highly beneficial to US interests. By implication, by these indices, the USTR suggests that the fears that spawned the original interest in the Dole Commission were unwarranted. Indeed, the US rate of success with the DSM since the WTO commenced is slightly better than it was during the 1980s when the DSM first came to be used intensively as means of resolving trade disputes.

Whatever the views of the USTR, and irregardless of the non-existence of the Dole Commission, the same section of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act that provides for a

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20 In 77 cases in the 1980s, as either plaintiff or defendant, the US prevailed in 57. Overall for the period between 1948 and 1998 in 125 cases, the United States prevailed in 84. See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, pp. 302-325.
five year review of US participation in the WTO, also provides that within 90 days of Congress receiving this report, just as with the Dole Commission bill, any member may introduce a joint resolution of both Houses calling for US withdrawal from the WTO.\textsuperscript{21} Such a resolution must be placed on the calendar for action no later than 45 days after being introduced. If passed by the Congress and signed by the President, it would trigger US withdrawal subject to the six months advance notification required by the WTO’s Article XV. In response to the USTR’s five year report and citing the eight decisions that have gone against the United States, a joint resolution calling for US withdrawal from the WTO was introduced within a matter of days of the report’s release.\textsuperscript{22} Because of the expedited schedule required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, hearings were held on the resolution within a month of its filing.\textsuperscript{23} However little chance the WTO Review Commission Act has of passage in the near future, a resolution calling for US withdrawal from the WTO has still far less chance of passage. A little more than two months after hearings were held, the resolution was voted down on the House floor.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} 103\textsuperscript{rd} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, \textit{Uruguay Round Agreements Acts}, Section 125.

\textsuperscript{22} Bruce Stokes, “Preparing to Bypass the WTO” \textit{Financial Times} March 29, 2000, p.13. Actually, the joint resolution was initially introduced even before the USTR report was sent to Congress, because the USTR report was sent late. The resolution was then withdrawn and re-introduced (“House Members Move to Sponsor Resolution for US WTO Withdrawal”), \textit{Inside US Trade} Vol. 18, No. 2 March 3, 2000.


\textsuperscript{24} The joint resolution was defeated in the House of Representatives June 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2000.
IV. Resources and US Performance at the WTO

It is possible that the absence of a review commission composed of respected jurists may actually increase the political sensitivity of each adverse WTO outcome for the US and lead to undue focus on quantitative indicators of success at the DSM. In this connection, the resources the USTR has at its disposal to pursue litigation at the WTO does become an issue. It may be as Alan Wolff forecast in his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee that the USTR is losing cases it should win at the WTO because its lawyers are “overworked”. While it may seem obvious that more resources should strengthen the position of the United States in international economic disputes, senior US trade officials have often taken the opposite view. Ambassador Mickey Kantor, when he was USTR, argued that his agency’s great virtue was its small size and that this small size was the key to its success. Whether because of Ambassador Kantor’s views, or because of the constraints imposed by the large Federal budget deficits that Congress faced during much of the 1990s, despite the creation of the WTO, NAFTA, and APEC, to mention just a few new responsibilities, USTR is no larger today than it was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration took office. In recent years, the current USTR, Charlene Barshefsky has


27 In both fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2000, USTR had 203 full-time equivalent authorized positions. In 1993, this consisted of 173 positions with USTR and 40 authorized detailees from other agencies. In 2000, USTR has 178 positions with 35 authorized detailees (Michael Kantor, “Hearings” House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
asked for, but has been denied large increases in her staff. In 1999, she asked for seven new positions but her request was completely ignored. This year Ambassador Barshefsky is asking for 25 full-time career positions within USTR.

V. Resources, Success and Success Rates

Suppose for whatever reason that the USTR’s size were to change, what would happen to US performance at the WTO. To analyze this issue, and leaving aside until Section VII of this paper all questions of strategic behavior including reactions of trading partners, assume that the USTR has the utility function

\[ U \left( a(X, \delta), b(X, \delta) \right) \]

where

- \( a(X, \delta) \) is the proportion of cases won at the WTO
- \( b(X, \delta) \) is the number of cases won at the WTO
- \( X \) is the number of cases brought before the WTO
- \( \delta \) is the resources the USTR will use above the minimum K required per case

The utility function posited here reflects USTR interest, as evident in its recent report on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, April 5, 1995; Charlene Barshefsky, “Hearings on USTR Agenda and Budget Request” House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice State and the Judiciary, April, 1995). While global and regional agreements have created new responsibilities for USTR, it is also true that it is not yet engaged in a round of world-wide multilateral negotiations as it was in the early 1990s.

28 Charlene Barshefsky, “USTR Agenda and Budget Request” House Appropriations Committee, Sub-Committee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, March 17, 1999.
US performance at the WTO, in its success-rate as well as in its total number of wins. Note further that

\[ f(y) \text{ is the 'base' probability that case number 'y' is won by the US, with } f'(y) < 0, \]

that is, potential WTO cases can be ordered according to their probability of success on the assumption only \( k \) resources are used per case. The probability of success can be affected by \( \delta \)

\[ g(\delta) \text{ is the increased likelihood that any particular case is won due to 'extra' resources (independent of which case)} \]

\[ g'(\delta) > 0, \quad g''(\delta) < 0 \quad \text{with} \]

\[ \lim_{\delta \to \infty} g(\delta) < 1 - \lim_{x \to 0} f(x) \quad (\text{Impossible to guarantee any win}) \]

The problem for the USTR is \( \operatorname{Max}_{X, \delta} U\left(a(X, \delta), b(X, \delta)\right) \text{subject to } (K + \delta)X \leq m \)

where \( m \) are the total resources available to the USTR.

Note the success rate, \( a(X, \delta) = \frac{1}{X} \int_0^X f(y)dy + g(\delta) \text{ with} \)

\[
\frac{da}{dx} = \frac{1}{X} f(X) - \frac{1}{X^2} \int_0^X f(y)dy < 0
\]

\[
\frac{d^2a}{dX^2} = \frac{1}{X} f'(X) - \frac{2}{X^2} f(X) + \frac{2}{X^3} \int_0^X f(y)dy > 0
\]

\[
\frac{d^2a}{dXd\delta} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{da}{d\delta} = g'(\delta) > 0
\]

\[
\frac{d^2a}{d\delta^2} = g''(\delta) < 0
\]

and the number of wins, \( b(X, \delta) = Xa(X, \delta) = \int_0^X f(y)dy + Xg(\delta) \text{ with} \)

\[
\frac{db}{dX} = f(X) + g(\delta) > 0
\]
\[
\frac{d^2 b}{dX^2} = f'(X) < 0 \\
\frac{d^2 b}{dX d\delta} = g'(\delta) > 0 \\
\frac{db}{d\delta} = Xg'(\delta) > 0 \\
\frac{d^2 b}{d\delta^2} = Xg''(\delta) < 0
\]

The USTR's problem written as a LaGrangean is

\[
L(X, \delta, \lambda) = U(a(X, \delta), b(X, \delta)) - \lambda((K + \delta)X - m)
\]

which leads to the first order conditions

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} \frac{da}{dX} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} \frac{db}{dX} = (K + \delta)\lambda \\
\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} \frac{da}{d\delta} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} \frac{db}{d\delta} = X\lambda \\
(K+\delta)X=m
\]

The Hessian here is

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a^2} & \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial b} & \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial b^2} \\
\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial dX} & \frac{d^2 b}{dX^2} & \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} f'(X) \\
\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial b \partial d\delta} & \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} g'(\delta) > 0 & \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} g'(\delta) > 0 \\
\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial d\delta} & \frac{\partial U}{\partial a} g''(\delta) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} Xg''(\delta) < 0 & \frac{\partial U}{\partial a} g''(\delta) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} Xg''(\delta) < 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The Hessian is negative semi-definite as long as \(g'(\delta)\) is not too big, and \(\frac{d^2 U}{dX^2}\), (the top left corner) is negative.

VI. The Comparative Statics of the USTR Problem

The total number of US wins at the WTO is clearly increasing in USTR resources

\[
\frac{db}{dm} = \frac{db}{dX} \frac{dX}{dm} + \frac{db}{d\delta} \frac{d\delta}{dm}
\]
This presumably is the relationship Ambassador Wolff had in mind. As the USTR report on
the WTO and Ambassador Barshefsky’s own Congressional testimony makes clear,
however, there is also interest in a, the rate of success. Here the results are ambiguous

\[
\frac{da}{dm} = \frac{da}{dx} \frac{dx}{dm} + \frac{da}{d\delta} \frac{d\delta}{dm},
\]

which can be positive or negative.

Totally differentiating the first order conditions with respect to \((X, \delta, \lambda, m)\) leads to:

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} \left( \frac{d^2 a}{dX^2} \frac{dX}{dm} \right) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} \left( f'(X) \frac{dX}{dm} + g'(\delta) \frac{d\delta}{dm} \right) = \lambda \frac{d\delta}{dm} + (k + \delta) \frac{d\lambda}{dm}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} \left( g''(m) \frac{d\delta}{dm} \right) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial b} \left( g'(\delta) \frac{dX}{dm} + X g'' \frac{d\delta}{dm} \right) = \lambda \frac{dX}{dm} + X \frac{d\lambda}{dm}
\]

\[
(K + \delta) \frac{dX}{dm} + X \frac{d\delta}{dm} = 1
\]

These three equations can be solved as a system to find \(\frac{dX}{dm}\) and \(\frac{d\delta}{dm}\).

\[
\frac{d\delta}{dm} = \left[ X + \frac{1}{K + \delta} \left( -U_b (K + \delta) X g''(\delta) - U_a (K + \delta) g''(\delta) - X \lambda \right) \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
\frac{dX}{dm} = \frac{1}{(K + \delta)} \left( 1 - X \frac{d\delta}{dm} \right), \text{ or } \delta \text{ and } X \text{ are substitutes.}
\]

Returning to the question of the sign of

\[
\frac{da}{dm} = \frac{da}{dx} \frac{dx}{dm} + \frac{da}{d\delta} \frac{d\delta}{dm}
\]

This can be restated as the effect marginal resources have on the marginal success rate
depends on the effect of marginal resources on the impact of each of the USTR’s two
possible uses of these resources

\[
\text{Resources per US case at the WTO}
\]
Number of US cases at the WTO

Decreasing (increasing) $g''(\delta^*)$, that is lessening (increasing) the effect of above minimum resources per case, decreases (increases) the denominator of $\frac{d\delta}{dm}$, and therefore $\frac{d\delta}{dm}$ is increased (decreased) while $\frac{dX}{dm}$ is decreased (increased), thereby increasing (decreasing) $\frac{da}{dm}$. In other words, the less (more) rapidly the effectiveness of marginal resources used per case ($g''(\delta^*)$) is falling (from the equilibrium amount of resources per case, $K + \delta^*$), the greater (smaller) the share of any increase in marginal resources will be used to increase resources per case. Because resources per case is what is assumed to increase WTO success rates, less (more) rapid marginal decline in the effect of resources used per case correspond with greater resources increasing (lowering) success rates.

Decreasing (increasing) $f''(X^*)$ increasing (decreasing) the rate at which the ‘base’ success rate is falling at $X^*$ decreases (increases) $\frac{d^2a}{dX^2}$ (guaranteeing the Hessian is negative semi-definite) and decreases (increases) the denominator of $\frac{d\delta}{dm}$, so once again $\frac{d\delta}{dm}$ is increased (decreased), $\frac{dX}{dm}$ is decreased (increased) and $\frac{da}{dm}$ is increased. This means the more rapidly (slowly) the probability of success at the WTO ($f'(X)$) is falling (from the marginal US WTO case, $X^*$, in equilibrium), the lower (higher) the share of any marginal increases in resources that will go towards a new US case at the WTO. Instead more of these marginal increases in resources will go towards increasing resources per case (starting new cases) and therefore to higher (lower) success rates.
The impact that USTR preferences have on the allocation of its resources can be seen with the use of the first order conditions

\[(K + \delta)X = m, \text{ and therefore } X = \frac{m}{K + \delta}\]

Substituting this into

\[U_a g'(\delta) + XU_b g'(\delta) = X\lambda \]

Gives

\[\left((K + \delta)U_a + mU_b\right)g'(\delta) = m\lambda\]

Suppose there is an increase (decrease) in importance to the USTR of the success rate. Because utility is homogeneous in degree zero the comparative statics for such a change are the same sign as if \(U_a\) is increased (decreased) and \(U_b\) decreased (increased) in the ratio necessary to leave \(\lambda\) unchanged. Since \(g''(\delta)<0\) and the above condition must hold for all utility functions, \(\delta\) must increase (decrease). Given \(X = \frac{m}{K + \delta}\), this means \(X\) must decrease (increase). Because the USTR success rate at the WTO is increasing in \(\delta\) and decreasing in \(X\), the success rate increases (decreases).

It appears the view implicit in congressional appropriations for USTR and explicit in Ambassador Kantor’s remarks, under some conditions, can be correct. Less resources for the USTR can mean a higher success rate. In thinking about this issue, it is important to keep in mind that it is the USTR itself that ultimately controls the number of US cases that go before the WTO. The more cases the USTR allows to go before a dispute settlement panel the more cases it will win, but assuming the cases with the highest chance of success at the WTO are taken there first, the more cases it will also lose.\(^{29}\) To the extent that both

\(^{29}\) On the last three points, see Robert E. Hudec, *Enforcing International Trade Law*, p. 326.
the number of successes and the rate of success are politically salient, there is a trade-off here. The trade-off will depend on how quickly the probability of success in an additional case taken to the WTO declines by comparison with how much investing additional resources on cases already at the WTO raises the probability of success with them. Depending on how much the USTR values number of success versus success rates will determine together with these two factors how its resources are allocated. If additional cases bring with them very low probability of success by comparison with investing additional resources in existing cases, new resources for the USTR will raise both the success rate and the number of wins. Paradoxically, if there are remain promising cases that are not being brought to the WTO because of a lack of resources, new resources for the USTR can lower its rate of success at the WTO even while it increases the number of wins.

VI. USTR Behavior and MITI Reactions

The preceding analysis assumes that the USTR values all cases equally. It also does not discuss reactions that US trading partners might make in response to an increase in USTR resources. Suppose instead these possibilities are now allowed for in a simple example. Assume USTR and MITI are contesting two cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The issue is how USTR and MITI will split their resources. Suppose USTR’s utility function is

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30 I would like to thank participants in the May Pre-Conference, particularly Theresa Greaney and Rob Howse, for their suggestions that this section be written. Needless to say, they are not to blame for the form it has taken.
\[ U = \alpha a + \beta b^* , \]
a special case of the utility function used in the preceding sections. While \( a \) is still the win rate with wins unweighted, \( b^* \) now weights wins according to their importance to USTR. When \( b^* \) is calculated, the first case is weighted more significantly than the second. USTR gives Case 1 a weighting of 1, while Case 2 is given a weighting of \( x \).

\[ 1 > x > 0 \]
is the amount USTR weights a win in Case 2. As before, the more resources USTR uses per case, the greater the chance of winning that case. Once again, \( K \) resources are the ‘base’ resources used per case (here set exogenously to 0). \( \tau \) are the additional resources the USTR will use for the first case. \( n \) represents total USTR resources (set exogenously to 1).

MITI is assumed to have a utility function of the same form as USTR.

\[ U' = \rho c + \theta d^* \]
c is MITI’s win rate and \( d^* \) is its weighted number of wins. For MITI, Case 1 also has a weight of 1, while Case 2 is weighted \( h \) with

\[ 1 > h > 0 \]

As is likely, both USTR and MITI will find Case 1 more important. For MITI, as for USTR, the more resources, the more likely a case will be won before the USTR. \( K \) are the base resources MITI uses per case (here also set exogenously to zero). \( \gamma \) are the extra MITI’s resources used for Case 1. \( m \) are MITI’s total resources.

As before, there is an exogenous ‘base’ probability USTR will win each of the two cases. This probability is denoted \( f(1) \) and \( f(2) \) for Cases 1 and 2, respectively. Resources
affect USTR chances according to the following relationship, also a special case of the function used in the preceding sections.

\[ g(\text{case}) = -e^{-\nu \tau} + e^{-\nu \gamma} - \mu \tau \gamma \]

where

\( \nu > 0 \) is a measure of the effect of extra resources (set exogenously to 2)

\( \mu > 0 \) is a measure of the degree of strategic interaction (set exogenously to 1).

For the purposes of illustration here, it is assumed that USTR acts as a strategic substitute. The more resources MITI puts on one case, the less valuable USTR’s resources on that case become, and the less resources USTR wants to put on that case. The opposite must be true for MITI. It acts as a strategic complement.\(^{31}\) The more resources USTR put on a case, the more valuable MITI’s resources on that case become and the more resources MITI wants to put on that case.

From above, USTR maximizes

\[
(0.5\alpha + \beta)(f(1) - e^{-\nu \tau} + e^{-\nu \gamma} - \mu \tau \gamma + (0.5\alpha + x\beta)[f(2) - e^{-\nu(1-\tau)} + e^{-\nu(1-\gamma)} - \mu(1-\tau)(1-\gamma)]
\]

First order condition:

\[
(1-x)(\beta(ve^{-\nu \delta} - \mu \gamma) - \mu(\frac{1}{2}\alpha + \beta)(n - 2k)) = 0
\]

The second order condition is satisfied for the assumed parameters:

\[
-(1-x)\beta(ve^{-\nu \delta}) < 0
\]

In the same way, MITI maximizes

\(^{31}\) The assignment of these roles to USTR and MITI is arbitrary. The roles could equally well be reversed.
(.5\rho + \theta)(1 - f(1) + e^{-\nu\tau} - e^{-\nu\gamma} + \mu\gamma) + (.5\rho + x\theta)(1 - f(2) + e^{-\nu(1 - \tau)} - e^{-\nu(1 - \gamma)} + \mu(1 - \tau)(1 - \gamma))

First order condition:

\[(1 - h)\theta(ve^{-\nu\gamma} + \mu\tau) - \mu(\frac{1}{2}\rho + h\theta)(m - 2k) = 0\]

Once again, the second order condition is satisfied for the assumed parameters:

\[-(1 - h)\theta(v^2 e^{-\nu\gamma}) < 0\]

Table 1 summarizes the equilibria for the setup just presented. The base case assumes \(\alpha = \beta = \rho = \theta = 1\) and \(h = x = 0.5\). .05 values for \(h\) and \(x\) mean Case 1 is much more important to both USTR and MITI than is Case 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>(\Delta 1a)</th>
<th>(\Delta 1b)</th>
<th>(\Delta 2a)</th>
<th>(\Delta 2b)</th>
<th>(\Delta 3)</th>
<th>(\Delta 4a)</th>
<th>(\Delta 4b)</th>
<th>(\Delta 5a)</th>
<th>(\Delta 5b)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\rho)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\theta)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>(\delta)</td>
<td>0.1825</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>.1845</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action</td>
<td>(\gamma)</td>
<td>0.8093</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>.7612</td>
<td>.771</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>result g (case 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.6437</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.6408</td>
<td>-.637</td>
<td>-.6137</td>
<td>-.6415</td>
<td>-.6431</td>
<td>-.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>result g (case 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.203</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>.2298</td>
<td>.25402</td>
<td>.1772</td>
<td>.1134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The baseline in Table 1 indicates how USTR and MITI divide the extra increment of resources each gets. Despite USTR and MITI both valuing the first case twenty times more than the second, USTR, unlike MITI, will devote a disproportionate amount of its resources to Case 2. This result follows from the assumption that the USTR acts as a strategic substitute and MITI as a strategic complement.

$\Delta 1$ explores what happens when USTR puts less of a weight on Case 2 than does MITI. Unsurprisingly relative to the baseline, USTR becomes more likely to win Case 1 and less likely to win Case 2. More surprisingly in $\Delta 2$, when USTR puts more weight on Case 2 than does MITI, giving USTR more resources, when MITI will get matching resources, will make it less likely that USTR will win Case 2 while it is more likely to win Case 1 relative to the outcome in the baseline. With $\Delta 3$ the more important USTR and MITI find Case 2 relative to Case 1, the more likely relative to the baseline, USTR is to win Case 1, but the less likely it is to win Case 2.

$\Delta 4$ and $\Delta 5$ explore how the allocation of incremental resources for USTR and MITI changes when, unlike the baseline and the preceding simulation, USTR and MITI place different weights on the success rates and the winning of cases weighted by their importance. Surprisingly for $\Delta 4$ the more importance USTR places on the success rate relative to MITI, the less likely it is to win Case 2 while becoming no more likely to win Case 1. For $\Delta 5$, and in contrast with the results for USTR, if MITI places relatively more importance on success rates than does USTR, MITI becomes more likely to win Case 2, but somewhat less likely to win Case 1.

From the perspective of the issues discussed in the preceding section, in each instance (through least for the base case), extra resources actually lowers the success rate
for USTR. Even for $\Delta 4$, the more important the success rate for USTR, with extra resources for both USTR and MITI, the lower the success rate is likely to be for them. Unlike the preceding section, this finding does not follow from extra resources encouraging USTR to take on additional cases with a low probability of success. Rather as a strategic substitute it is poorly suited to improve its welfare in an environment where both sides have more resources. For example, were USTR to attempt to bring only the first case and not second to the WTO, both USTR and MITI would put all their resources on this case and $g(1) = -1$. For the setup here, it makes sense for USTR to try both cases. The results for MITI, which are the exact opposite of those for USTR, show that for a strategic complement, more resources can lead to both a higher success rate and a greater likelihood of winning the most important cases notwithstanding USTR getting the same increment in new resources.

VII. Consistency and the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Since the enhancement of the DSM with the creation of the WTO, there has been an upsurge in its use. During the 1980s, 127 complaints were taken to the DSM.\textsuperscript{32} During its first five years of operation alone, the WTO’s DSM has received 185 complaints.\textsuperscript{33} US use of the DSM reflects these general trends. Between 1980 and the beginning of 1990, the US


brought 39 complaints to the DSM.\textsuperscript{34} Between 1995 and the beginning of this year, the US has brought 60 complaints.\textsuperscript{35} This implies an increase in the annual incidence of complaining to the WTO by the United States of over 200%.

The greatly increased US use of the DSM can’t be the result of increased resources. In the late 1990s, the USTR budget has been no greater than it was in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{36} Rather, it has been suggested that the WTO’s DSM is being used more often now because the new texts of the Uruguay Round Agreements are ambiguous.\textsuperscript{37} A more predictable environment allows parties to a conflict to save themselves the trouble of using up scarce resources by resolving their dispute outside the WTO, anticipating what would happen if they went through the DSM process. While this is a plausible view of the relationship between uncertainty and the use of the DSM, in theory, the inverse relationship is also not implausible. Consider the following.

Suppose USTR has a case that it believes has merit $\varphi$. If USTR takes the case to the DSM, it will get

$$ (1 - \rho) \varphi + \rho \varepsilon $$

\textsuperscript{34} Robert E. Hudec, \textit{Enforcing International Trade Law}, p. 316.


where $\rho$ is a noise parameter and $\epsilon$ is a population mean of a random drawing of possible remedies for USTR’s complaints. If $\rho = 1$, the DSM result is pure noise, if $\rho = 0$, there will be outcome with merit $\phi$. Suppose MITI offers $p$ settlement to USTR. MITI gets $-p$, if USTR accepts but $- [n + (1 - \rho)\phi + (\rho\epsilon)]$ if USTR rejects where $n$ is the resource cost of pursuing the case at WTO.

USTR will accept $p$ if $p \geq (1 - \rho)\phi + \rho\epsilon$ or $(p - \rho\epsilon)/(1 - \rho) \geq \phi$. MITI’s expected payoff (not knowing $\phi$) is

$$pF[\frac{p - \rho\epsilon}{1 - \rho}] + \int_{p - \rho\epsilon}^{\infty} \{ (1 - \rho)\phi + \rho\epsilon + n \} dF(\phi)$$

(where $F$ is prior on $\phi$).

First order condition (solving for $p$ in equilibrium)

$$F[\frac{p - \rho\epsilon}{1 - \rho}] + \frac{p}{1 - \rho} F[\frac{p - \rho\epsilon}{1 - \rho}] - \frac{p + c}{1 - \rho} F[\frac{p - \rho\epsilon}{1 - \rho}] = 0$$

or $(1 - \rho) \frac{F'}{F} = n$

when $F$ is uniform $p = \epsilon\rho + n$ ($\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$).

In this case USTR will accept if

$$n \geq (1 - \rho)\phi \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{n}{1 - \rho} \geq \phi$$

Thus, with a uniform distribution more noise $\rho$

1) increases offer $p$;

2) increases the probability that the conflict will not be taken to the WTO.
This suggests that it may not be a new, untested and unpredictable WTO that is generating more cases. In fact, the set-up suggests that perhaps the new WTO’s DSM might be more rather than less predictable than the GATT’s forty-year old DSM. The speed and automaticity (panel findings accepted except if opposed by a consensus of WTO Council Members) of the new DSM may make the whole WTO more predictable than before, notwithstanding the inevitable vagueness of a new trade treaty.\textsuperscript{38} And because it is more predictable than before it is being used.\textsuperscript{39}

VIII. Conclusions

At the time the Uruguay Round Agreements were passed by Congress, particular concern was expressed about their implications for US national sovereignty. Concern was sufficiently great that the Clinton Administration committed its support to the creation of a commission that would review each adverse decision against the United States by the WTO. The commission was designed such that the outcome of its review process might trigger a serious Congressional consideration of US withdrawal from the WTO.

While the so-called Dole Commission was never created, the Congressional controversy surrounding the ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreement has led to particular concern with USTR performance at the WTO. Curiously, enhanced

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} There is already a substantial analytical literature on the resolution of trade disputes inside or outside the GATT or WTO. See, for example, Kathryn E. Speir and David E. Weinstein, “Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Co-operation” in Winston W. Chang and Seiichi Katayama (eds.) \textit{Imperfect Competition in International Trade} (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). None of this work, however, allows for USTR concern with success rates.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Congressional concern has not gone hand in hand with more resources for USTR. Over the 1990s, USTR has rarely asked for, and has never received additional resources for its work.

The analysis here shows that if the USTR is concerned not only about the number of cases it wins but also about its rate of success, then having more resources may have an ambiguous impact on the USTR’s rate of success. Depending on how relatively promising are the additional cases that may yet be brought by USTR to the WTO, and how usefully additional resources may be applied to existing cases, it is possible that more resources can lower USTR’s success rate. This is true, though for different reasons, when explicit allowance is made for the response by the other party to the dispute to a USTR commitment of additional resources.

More resources cannot explain the increased use the USTR has made since the WTO was established, because USTR has received no additional resources. Rather, a more predictable DSM may have encouraged more rather than fewer cases to be brought to the WTO in preference to extra WTO bilateral settlements.