Stephen Biegun - International Diplomacy Challenges: North Korea

September 6, 2019 1:22:00
Kaltura Video

Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun discusses U.S. policy and strategy for achieving the denuclearization of North Korea and the transformation of U.S.-North Korean relations.

Transcript:

Good afternoon, everyone.


Welcome back to campus.


I'm Michael Barr.


I'm the Joan and Stanford Weil dean of the 


Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy


at the University of Michigan.


I’m delighted to welcome you to all of this,


the first event of a series of


distinguished speakers to mark the


launch Weiser Diplomacy Center.


I want to start by thanking regent Ron


Weiser and Mrs. Eileen Weiser who are


with us right here today for their generous


Donation to establish the Weiser 


Diplomacy Center. Ron was U.S.


Ambassador to Slovakia and


Eileen served alongside him in their


time, and they are both passionately


committed to the importance of diplomacy


and to the men and women to serve our


country abroad.


They are wonderful friends, and we are


grateful for their strong support of the


Ford School and the University of


Michigan more broadly.


So let me begin, please let me ask you


to join me in thanking Ron and Eileen


Weiser.


[Applause]


 This Weiss diplomacy center serves as


a unique hub for academic and practical


training and policy dialogue, preparing


our students to become the nation's next


foreign policy leaders, diplomats and


experts in foreign affairs.


As a meeting point for practitioners,


men and women whose careers span the


apex of important policy and academics,


the WDC provides a bridge between


University of Michigan and the


foreign policy community.


With Ron and Eileen's help, the WDC can


become the country's leading institutions


for International affairs.


The previously the mission of the WDC has


three parts.


First, hands-on practical training and


mentor ship for rising foreign policy


professionals who have access to, Sr.


diplomats serving as professor of


international diplomacy and visiting


professors here at the Ford school.


Second, oversee study and policy


engagement with internships and


engagement opportunities that span the


globe.


This summer students went to the forgs


an international migration in Jenn eve,


a the Asia.


The U.S. embassy in Bogota and a leaned


development organization in India,elingy


with the DWDC also funds shorter student


initiatives over spring break for


example last year four students went to


Guatemala to work with a leaned human


rights group on forensic anthropology.


community on a wide ray of topics Frank


peace and security to development


document to humility rights and the


environment.


This line-up this fall exposes our


students tie breadth of experience and


policy perspective including today's


speaker Steve Biegun as well as Steve


hadley, Samantha power, Condoleezza Rice


and Hillary Rodham Clinton.


As well as leading former ambassadors


from many eras and countries.


You will note that this launch series


also supports our conversations across


difference initiative.


As you well know, these are challenging


times in our nation with fractious


political discourse, gridlock and


partisanship and be an increasing lack


of trust in institutions everywhere.


It is in moments like this when the


craft of diplomacy is even more


essential, and when talking and


listening across political and other


differences is really essential.


We are thus honored to bring to the


campus a wealth of expertise this fall


and we could not be more delighted to


begin with the insights of today's


speaker U.S. special representative for


North Korea, Stephen Biegun.


I'm going to turn over the podium now to


faculty director of Weirs diplomacy


center Ford school faculty member John


who will introduce our speaker.


John.


[Applause]


 Thank you, Michael, and welcome to


all of you.


It's very much my honor to introduce


Steve Biegun.


He's a Michigan man and he embodies


leader qualities and the commitment to


serve that we aim to foster at the new


Weiser diplomacy center.


Since his undergraduate studs here atum


in Russian and political science he's


pane a leader in the practice of a


attorney affairs through several


different channels on Capitol Hill,


through the executive branch and


business in the non-profit sector.


Shortly after the cold war at a critical


junk commuter in Russia he what is the


In country director in Moscow for the


International Republican Institute, a


leading non-profit organization


promoting freedom and democracy abroad.


He has held senior positions in the


house foreign relations committees as


well as been chief of staff to the


Senate foreign relations committee and


national security adviser to former


Senate majority leader Bill Frist.


In those capacities he's worked on a


wide array of issues including the


foreign aid budget, trade agreements


with various partners, defense,


intelligence, European affairs and more.


During the George W. Bush administration


he served as executive secretary at the


national security council.


This is essentially the NF treatment


chief operating soar ppts it's a crucial


roll in creating policies and effective


interagency process, exactly the kind of


of practical foreign policy knowledge


that we're trying to cultivate and that


our students are learning in the Ford


school's new course on the NFC this


term.


Steve Biegun has extensive


leadership experience in the private


center having sender as a VP at


international affairs at Ford Motor


Company overseeing Ford's interanswers


around the world.


He returned to government I year ago as


U.S. special representative for North


Korea, ab pointed shortly after the June 2018 Singapore summit between


President Trump and North Korean leader


Kim Jong-un.


The summit was a bold and controversial


step, one of the signature foreign


policy initiatives of the trump


administration.


The president and secretary of state


Pompeo saw somebody who had the


diplomat skills to capitalize on the


political opening and drive progress


toward the very difficult issue of North


Korean denuclearization as well as


related challenges in the relationship.


The fact that they chose Steve Biegun


for that role testifies to the strength


of both his diplomatic skills and his


reputation.


Over the past year he's led U.S. policy


toward the DPRK, that's the democratic


people's republic of Korea on North


Korea, and spearhead U.S. negotiations


with okay.


Yong and engagement with reasonable


explies partners toward those pames


we're privileged to be able to hear from


Steve Biegun today about the challenges


and the opportunities and the reply


diplomacy undergoing noirks, and we're


also grateful for co-sponsorship of this


lecture by our friends and colleagues at


the name center for Korean stud it's a


UM.


Before he begins we'll have a time


toward the end of the session for


audience questions.  Please write your


questions on the note cards that our


staff will provide and collect.


Ford school students Ryan van we and


Zachary will present the questions with


our own ambassador.


Now on behalf of the Ford center and the


name center give Steve Biegun a warm


weerchl welcome.


[Applause]


-- Wolfe even welcome.


[Applause]


.


 Thank you, Dean Barr.


Thank you, John, for that kind


introduction.


And thank you all for inviting he here


today.


I had a long day already here on campus.


I had an opportunity earlier today to


meet with a group of students, started


the program at the Ford school called we


listen.


It's geared to have civil discussion,


thoughtful discussion and to engage


each other on public policy issues.


It's a truly inspirational group.


Student-driven.


And if you don't know about it, I'd


recommend you look up their website.


If you're a student here, I'd recommend


you think about it.


They're doing great work for the


university.


I also had a chance to have lunch today


with a group students from the Ford


school, an incredibly impressive bunch.


Many of them already well into


successful careers.


And it was a real privilege and honor to


spend this time this morning with so


many we never students.


 Wolverine.


I can't tell you what a great pleasure


it is to be on the campus of the


University of Michigan where for me it


all began so many years ago.


Tomorrow marks exactly there go years


since I first sat down in a lecture hall


here at the University of Michigan.


Having left a small Michigan town where


I grew up, I stepped onto this campus to


begin an educational journey that has


served me my entire career.


It opened the world to me and, more


importantly, it opened me to the world.


I'm grateful for the incredible


teachers, visiting instructors, guest


speakers, the teachings, the rallies, the


protests and the vibrant, eclectic,


diverse and irrepressible student body


that the University of Michigan has


always attracted.


I've learned to think in ways that have


benefited me throughout my career.


It's great to be home.


Go blue.


[Applause]


I'd like to add my thanks to the


University of Michigan's Ford school


public policy and the Nam center for


Korean studies for hosting me this


afternoon, and it's an honor to be the


inaugural speaker of the Weiser


diplomacy center's speaker series.


Ron Weiser has for many years been a


friend, and for a few years even a


colleague in government.


I know firsthand of his and his wife


Eileen's devotion to public service and


to the advancement of American interests


and ideals around the world.


This new diplomacy center is a fitting


embodiment of that devotion.


Thank you, Ron.


[Applause]


In the three decades since I left Ann


Arbor I have had the opportunity to work


on many challenging and interesting


issues in government and the private


sector.


But none that approaches the


consequences of the issue that I'll


speak on today as the United States


special representative for North Korea.


  Prior to taking this job, I wasn't


really looking to return to government.


In fact, I was quite happy in a job I


loved at wunt great American auto -- one


of the great American auto companies,


Ford Motor Company located just up the


road.


It was there that my grandfather and his


father before him made their livings,


and it was a great place to work.


But as is the case with Ron Weiser and


with so many other graduates of this


great university who, over the decade,


have answered the call of public


service, last year I accepted the


challenge of Secretary of State Mike


Pompeo to take up and carry forward a


remarkable diplomatic opportunity, an


opportunity created by President Trump


In June of 2018, the decision of the


president to meet at a summit in


Singapore with chairman Kim Jong-un of


North Korea was truly momentous.


At the con dilution first-ever meeting


between the leaders of our you two


countries, they shed a simple strayed


forward statement outlining a plan to


change the course of events on the


Korean peninsula through the


transformation of relations through the


establishment of a permanent peace and


the complete denuclearization of the


Korean peninsula.


And while there's still much work ahead


of us, if we are to fulfill those


commitments, the this fact of bold


leadership and the simple roadmap it


produced may well prove to be the key to


unlocking the puzzle of the Korean


Peninsula that has bedeviled the world


since the end of World War II.


Since that historic commit meeting in


Singapore, the president has maintained


a strong and focused deployment search


for a lasting peace on the Korean


peninsula.


He refuses to accept the fact that 66


years after fighting ended in the careen


war we have yet to find a successful


path to transforming relations and


establishing a permanent peace.


But the president has also been clear


that doing so will require the daunting


task of eliminating the growing threat


of weapons of mass destruction on the


Korean panes law.


The president has directed the starter


state, myself and the entire U.S.


national security team to spare no


effort in our negotiations to fulfill


the commitments that the two leaders


made at Singapore.


  We are aware that this diplomatic


opening is fragile.


We fully understand the consequences if


did I diplomacy fails, and we are


clear-eyed about the dangerous reality


of ongoing development by North Korea of


weapons of mass destruction and the


means to deliver them to the region and


to the world.


This is in defines of international


norms.


It is in violation of United Nations


security council resolutions.


And it is in contravention of Muppet


promises made by North Korea to never


possess such weapons.


For to us make progress towards peace


and to take major steps towards


transforming our relationship, North


Korea must be willing to fulfill its


commitment to achieve complete


denourishingization.


North Korea will never be able to


realize its full economic potential or


enjoy true economic security and


stability if it clings to weapons of


mass destruction.


The United States and the world will not


accept that.


And we and other countries in the region


need to understand that the outcome of


this diplomatic process will have


ramifications well beyond the Korean


peninsula.


Last year, after taking on this


assignment, I had the rare and special


opportunity to sit down with former


Secretary of State Henry kissinger to


discuss the way forward.


As he shared his observations and


thoughtful advice, one comment made a


particularly deep impression upon me.


Dr. Kissinger noted that we were charged


today with working toward the


elimination of North Korea's nuclear


weapons, but, he said, if this effort


fails, we will be working tomorrow on an


Asia wide nuclear proliferation


challenge.


  It does not require a leap of logic to


understand what Dr. Kingser was


predicting.


A North Korea that retains the ability


to threaten its neighbors with neecialg


weapons risks breaking the international


noamples non-proliferation built over 50


years.


While a number of countries and


economies in Asia have the scientific


wherewithal and the technical capacity


to develop nuclear weans they have made


the judgment that po sense such weapons


creates more risk for their security and


for their people.


Allies such as Japan and South Korea


have fore sworn nuclear weapons programs


in part because they trust the


protection of extended deterrence has


included in their alliance relationships


with the United States of America.


But how long will that conviction hold?


If such weapons air mere short range


ballistic missile night away from their


own territory?


At what point will voices in South Korea


and Japan and elsewhere in Asia begin to


ask if they need tro consider their own


nuclear capabilities?


And what will this mean for a region


whose prosperity and growth has been so


inex entribly tied to long-term


stability and peace.


It is very much in the interests of the


United States of America and every other


nation in the region to avoid this


eventuality.


If we are to escape an outcome that will


press nations in the region to consider


new and more dangerous strategic


choices, we must work together as allies


and partners in east Asia to achieve the


vision that was laid out at the sing   


Singapore summit.


As always, there are consequences for


failure.


And I fear Dr. Kissinger is correct,


that if the international community


fails in the undertaking, in this


undertaking, North Korea will not be the


last nuclear ceaps state in            


nuclear weapons state in Asia.


At this moment to achieve further


progress the most important step we can


take is for the United States and North


Korea to work together, to overcome the


policies and demonstrations of hostility


that compromise the simple ability of


our diplomats to talk and to sustain the


rhythm of negotiations.


  If we are to succeed, North Korea must


set aside its search for obstacles to


negotiations and instead seek the


opportunities for engagement while that


opportunity lasts.


  We have made clear to North Korea we


are prepared to engage as soon as we


hear from them.


We are ready, but we cannot do this by


ourselves.


  Between the United States and North


Korea there has been too little


communication, too much room for missal


accumulation and misunderstanding,


and almost no room at all for error.


Through direct engagement we must create


space and momentum for diplomacy.


We must set in motion anens intensive


set   of


set of negotiations and only if we do


that will we able to fulfill the our or


piece.


One we begin intensive negotiations we


can have action that both sides can take


to create more and better choices for


our leaders to consider.


Following the outline of the joint


statement issued last year by President


Trump and chairman Kim at the Singapore


summit, we can construct a set of


actions that are undertaken to elevate


relations from a place of hostility and


distrust toward an agreed and state that


fulfills the vision of our two leaders,


provided that there is a clear


commitment to fulfill all the


requirements of the agreements made


between the two leaders.


  Now, either the United States --


neither the United States nor Korea has


to accept all the risk of moving


forward, and there are immediate actions


that we can take if negotiations make


progress.


Judging by the talks President Trump has


had with chairman Kim and those that our


team has had over the past year with our


North Korean counterparts, it is clear


that both siding quickly agree to


significant actions that will declare to


our respective peoples and to the world


that the United States-North Korea


relations have taken an irreversible


turn away from convict.


Actions, much more than any words, can


infuse this diplomatic moment with more


energy.


the Korean peninsula and the Dorothy


orthodox is and necessities of at   at the


deternses to which they gief rise make a


peaceful-U.S. North Korea's relationship


hard to imagine, hard to imagine in the


way our current strategic and economic


relationship with Vietnam was hard to


imagine a mere 20 years ago, hard in the


way that alliances with Germany and


Japan were unthinkable in the waning


days of World War II, hard in the way


the e unification of Jeremy and a Europe


whole and free were difficult to imagine


even as the Berlin wall was falling.


There have been prior irrelevant it


negotiations with North Korea


over the past 25 years, to slow or


reverse the development weapons


of mass destruction but none of have yet


succeed in overcoming the legacy of a


brutal war and the decades of hostility


that followed.


Of course we are mindful that there is


no guarantee that our current diplomatic


efforts will succeed where others have


failed, but with the president's


direction and strong support, we are


committed to try through did   diplomacy to do


more, not pleps over the past year we've


been able to sustain political space and


momentum at home with bipartisan


agreement that diplomacy remains the


best choice.


Our team has invested significant time


and effort in consultations with


Congress, and we continue to draw


support from both sides of the aisle to


continue to test this opportunity.


Ion our borders, policies on


denuclearization of North Korea stand on


eye firm foundation of international


support.


Guided by a series of resolutions,


unanimously supported in the United


Nations security council and actively


supported by allies and partners in


Asia, Europe and around the world.


We are fully committed to bring an end


to the vestiges of hostile relations to


the Korean peninsula to follow the path


of security for north and South Korea


answered and to build the trust that is


the necessary foundation for a lasting


peace.  And through this, achieve the


elimination of weapons of mass


destruction and their means of delivery


on the Korean peninsula.


And if we are successful, there is so


much potential for opportunity ahead of


us.


Our two countries in the Indo Pacific


region as a whole would greatly benefit


from enhanced connectivity through the


Korean peninsula.


More open sea lands and overflights in


and around the peninsula, combined with


high-quality infrastructure investment


in North Korea would diversify and


shorten transport routes, open new


export markets for North Korean goods,


and open up vast additional areas for


economic development in North Korea and


in neighboring countries.


Energy flows in and out of North Korea


would lift the North Korean economy in


new diversified trading relationships


would improve living standards


throughout the peninsula and the region.


In terms of security, lowered tensions


will mean that our military forces will


no longer need to stand and train


perpetually ready to fight a war.


They could instead serve and cooperate


to build a foundation to support a


lasting peace.


And if we can forge a sustainable peace,


forge the modalities of cooperation, we


will reap the mutual rewards that will


spring from Frank discussions and many


other issues that divided the United


States and North Korea over all these


many years.


This is President Trump's vision and it


is a vision he is confident that


Chairman Kim shares.


When the president took as of more than


two years ago, North Korea represented


the most urgent national security


priority waiting on his desk.


What has moved the Korean peninsula off


of a path toward conflict and onto a


path of peace has been the bold


leadership of President Trump and


Chairman Kim.


Whereas the experts cownsd


incrementalism, the president understood


that the situation called for a clear


break with the past.


We needed to do something different,


something dramatic to head off conflict.


The president's decision to hole two


summits and to seek agreement at the


highest levels with the North Koreans


was not to say the least the


conventional wisdom of the Washington,


DC, foreign policy establishment.


The decision two months ago to propose


ap impromptu meeting with chairman Kim


had no guarantee of success, in fact,


Chairman Kim could have rejected the


last-minute invitation out of hand.


But he didn't.


And as a result of each of these


engagements between our two leaders, the


door to diplomacy has been held open a


little longer.    Over the course of


this past year, the president has made


clear to North Korea and to the world


that he has made this choice for the


United States.


He has given our negotiating team clear


instructions to deliver on his deep


commitment to transforming U.S.-North


Korean relations through diplomacy, as


agreed with chairman Kim at Singapore,


and he has said he is confident that


Chairman Kim will not sploint disappoint


him.


Bringing lasting piece to the Korean


Peninsula will ultimately only succeed


with the leadership of President Trump


and chairman kill.


Both must be able to see opportunity


where others inside their respective


systems do not.


Opportunity that could blossom from the


successful transformation of our


relations, the establishment of a


permanent peace regime on the Korean


peninsula, and the complete


denuclearization of the Korean


peninsula.


To succeed, both must choose this course


and follow through with actions that


will seize that opportunity.


The president is fully committed to


making significant progress toward these


goals in the year ahead and should


Chairman Kim share in President Trump's


commitment to advance the ideas I have


laid out today, he will find our team is


ready to turn this vision into reality.


Thank you.


[Applause]


 Okay.


To start off with our


question-and-answer session, I'm going


to have a few questions for Mr. Being be


UN to give Ryan and Zack a bit of time


to review some questions that you have


submitted from the audience and then


we'll open up the rest of the session to


hear your queries.


If I may, I'd like to start with a pair


of questions, one that's more a medium


term question and one that's more a


immediate short-term question.


A medium term question is this.


For many years the United States' policy


and expressed goal of negotiations with


North Korea has been to achieve a


complete verifiable and not easily


reversible denuclearization of the DPRK.


And surely Kim Jong-un and other leaders


in North Korea look at the cases of Iraq


and Libya and think of the weapons, the


nuclear weapons program as both an


extremely important bargaining chip with


the international community and some


form of insurance for a deeply


disfavored dictatorship.


And so I'm sure you agree that even if


the goal is realistic websites a very


challenging one to achieve.


The question is what do you see as the


key conditions under which this North


Korean regime would give consideration


to the types of serious and potentially


even irreversible reverse alsz   als of their


nuclear program that the United States


is demanding?


 Thank you, John, and certainly


something that we've spent a lot of time


thinking about.


  One of the -- there are several things


that are different about this diplomatic


initiative than how we have engaged


North Korea in the past, but one area in


particular that addresses the underlying


question you asked is that we're seeing


do a lot more than issue weaches mass


destruction.


The Singapore statement that I referred


to in my remarks actually has two parts


or four pillars as we refer to them.


The first is that the two leaders


committed to transform the relations


between our two countries.


The second is that the two leaders


committed to the establishment of a


permanent peace regime on the Korean


peninsula.


I imagine not everyone here is an expert


on the history of Korean peninsula, but


it's worth pointing out that the war


when it ended in 1953 ended in an


armistice.


Technically that war has not been


concluded with a treaty.


Establishing a permanent peace regime is


going to be critical to changing the


politics.


The two agreement they made was the


Korean peninsula.


The last, the fourth pillar which we


don't talk about as much is a


humanitarian initiative.


It's to recover the remains of the U.S.


soldiers and Marines who fell during the


Korean war, invest in other countries to


recover and account for their losses in


the Korean war, and we've expanded it


also in our discussions with the North


Koreans to include finding ways for


Koreans inside and outside North Korea


to reunify as families to meet each


other after a period of long division.


It is challenging.


As I said in my remarks, we're trying to


overcome 70 years of hostility on the


Korean peninsula.


That's a long time.


One of the anecdotes that was mention


today        mentioned


to me that has really Meads me was that


North Korea has existed longer than the


Soviet Union existed.


The Soviet Union is now the historical


blink of an eye.


North Korea-U.S. relations for seven


years.


We have a way find more than just


weapons of mass destruction issue.


We have to change the incentives.


And by changing the trajectory of our


policies, it's our hope that we can


likewise change the trajectory of


theirs.


North Korea doesn't need nuclear


weapons.


The United States does not intend any


hostile action toward North Korea but


we're going to have to build trust in


order to get them to a point where that


conviction is reflected in their


policies.


 I promise aid shorter term question,


and that is the immediate question of


how to get the North Korean delegation


back to the table.


There have been periods of on


again/off-again diplomacy.


Recently the North Korean leadership has


suggested that negotiations may be tied


in some fashion the to nature and extent


of U.S. joint exercises with its South


Korean military.


What do you see as the key steps that


the trump administration needs to take


to encourage or incentivize the North


Korean delegation to come back and talk?


After all, as you said in your remarks,


there is a sense in chts window of time


available for seizing this opportunity


is not infinite.


 Yes.


So of course we have to be ready.


We have to be prepared.


And we have to convey to the North


Koreans that we're prepared to have this


discussion on all parties, both sides.


We can and we have communicated that tom


North Koreans.


We've done it directly and indirectly.


We have down it through third parties.


We've I didn't publicly we've I didn't


privately.


The North Koreans know where we are.


The North Koreans know what the


opportunity is.


The North Koreans have a decision to


make on engagement.


We're prepared to do so when they're


ready.


As I said a moment ago.


And it's worth repeating, that we're


ready, but North Korea has to make that


choice too.


 I want to turn now to our excellent


students Ryan and Zack and allow them to


ask some of the questions that you all


have posed.


Ryan and Zack, if you could each


introduce of your very briefly before


you lead into the questions.


We want to give everyone in the room a


little illustration of what some of our


students are working on related to the


center.


 Thank you, professor.


Thank you, sir, for being here us with


us p I'm my name is Ryan am eye second


year national public policy student.


My focus for research has been on


international security policy.


The first question from the audience is


to what extent has the trump


administration withdrawn from the


comprehensive plan of action with Iran


impacted negotiations with North Korea?


 So the Iran nuclear corridor, the JCP


JCPOA certainly is an issue that the


North Korea answered would notice and it


goes to an underpinning concern that


they will certain have as to how any


agreement we reach together will be


durable.


I'm not responsible for the JCPOA but I


am undertaking the direction of the


Secretary of State and the president


diplomacy on that not entirely


dissimilar set of issues and a not


entirely dissimilar set of


circumstances.


But our answer, what's going to be


different about our efforts with North


Korea, is that we're trying to do much


more than the JCPOA did.


The JCP government, the Iran liewcialg


agreement targeted very narrowly the


issue of Iran's nuclear weapons programs


and suspended for a period of time those programs in hopes that some


other changes might occur in the


external environment that would allow


for the progress but also allow for fact


that Iran could revert back to the full


operation of its nuclear enrichment


after the conclusion


of that agreement.


That agreement was also intentionally,


the agreement intentionally excluded the


broader set of issues in the U.S.-Iran


relationship.


And so what the United States saw in


the aftermath of that agreement being


reached was that the increased economic


resources and the immediate gains that


Iran made in some of the settlements


that came Mel after the agreement


provided them with resources that they


chose to spend to further engage in


the destabilization of many nations in


region, including Yemen, Syria where


they had an active combat presence


undertaking brutal, brutal treatment of


the Syrian people, and also to strengthen 


their hold on Lebanon


through Hezbollah, and those eroded the


environment in which progress might have


been made with Iran, even with the


tenuous nature of the nuclear agreement


that had been reached in the temporary


nature.


In the case of North Korea, we answer


that question in our engagement with the


North Koreans because we're trying to do


much more.


We actually -- the president has


committed to transforming our


relationship with North Korea to


bringing about a permanent peace regime


to the Korean peninsula, to find areas


of cooperation to move forward in this


relationship at the same time that we're


also addressing the compelling and


dangerous threat of weapons of mass


destruction.


It's going to be hard.


I don't for a second take lightly the


mandate that the president has given us.


The North Koreans are willing to do the


same, we have a lot of potential to put


together a very durable agreement


between our two countries.


 And I'm also very honored to help


welcome you back.


My name is Zachary.


I'm currently a fourth year


undergraduate at the Ford school with a


focus in diplomacy, and my first


question to ask you is historically the


North Korean problem is also a China


problem.


To what extent, in your.


, have the tariffs, rhetoric and


adversarial posture toward China


affected negotiations.


 So a big country like ours and a big


country like China are going to have a


lot of interests around the world, and


to simplify it, we have to be able to


walk and chew gum at the same time.


The economic issues that we're


negotiating with China right now are


very important issues.


They aren't just important for the


president.


They're important to the economy and to


the future economic security of the


United States of America.


And that is a very tough negotiation


because we're trying to shift the


direction of China's economy to try to


convince them to shift the direction of


their economy in a way that has been


established over the course of the last


two decades.


        We work very closely, China on North


Korea, needless to say.


China has the largest land order of any


country in the world outside the


demilitarized zone.


Choon is going to be instrument       instrumental in the


cities success of international


diplomacy with North Korea as we go


forward.


We have invested quite bit of a time in


working with our Chinese counters parts.


We have developed a close relationship.


The Chinese in our SUV sent the right


messages to North Korea at every Surin.


And my Chinese counterpart told me when


we first met several months ago is


notwithstanding the other areas of


tension in the U.S.-China relation, that


China would compartmentalize North Korea


and their cooperation on that.


I told them that we would accept that


until we had evidence to suggest


otherwise, and we don't have any


evidence to suggest otherwise.


That's not as to say it's not,, of


course, there are enormous tensions in


hufs China relations.


Not only do we have the economic issues


that we're seeking to negotiate.


We have various national security


differences.


We have differences over Taiwan.


The student -- the street prophecies in


Hong Kong have exacerbated tensions in


the relationship even though we're not


driving that, China is feeling besieged.


There are many things China is doing in


places like Shenzhen and other parts of


of the south China sea that are add her


ents to us and we've raised concerns


about.


So it's not easy.


It's not easy to compartmentalize but


we've been successful so far, and I'll


tell you why.


Because China is not doing -- China is


not pursuing its policies in North Korea


as a favor to United States of America.


China's pursuing its own interests in


North Korea.


What I have told people before when


asked this question is my assessment of


China is they're 100% with us some of


the way.


[Laughter]


China wants peace and stability in the


Korean peninsula.


China wants the elimination of weapons


mass destruction on the Korean


peninsula.


There's a lot of thing we won't agree


on.


Our military alliance with the South


Koreans, other things like that.


But China for its own interests


parallels our interests, and that's the


basis for countries to work together.


I'm a big fan of countries acting in


their own interests and finding a way to


work with other countries that share


those interests.


In the case of North Korea so far we've


been able to do that pretty well with


the Chinese.


 Let me follow up very quickly with


that and ask you to expand on what you


see as China's constructive roles with


regard to North Korea.


There are sanctions enforcement,


political pressure.


I'd love to hear a bit more on that.


 First, just the messaging that comes


from the Chinese leader to the North


Koreans for the need to engage in a


intensive diplomatic process towards the


achievement of a peaceful and stable


Korean peninsula and elimination of


weapons of mass destruction.


China is not shy about that.


China voted for every UN security


council resolution by definition because


they can only pass with the unanimous


vote of the permanent five members of


the UN security council.


China has given voice to the policies


the same as us.


We share our objectives and our strategy


to a certain degree with the Chinese.


They give us useful feedback about they


have a lot of experience the in region.


But, of course, above all in the


maintaining the pressure on North Korea,


as we search for a diplomatic solution


there's no country that's more important


than China.


China is North Korea's largest trading


partner.


It shares a large land border and has


territory territorial waters add Jay


tent to North Korea.


So China's role in that dimension of the


critically important to the cities.


Again, we meet regularly with the


China's convoy.


Many times.


We just had a turnover in China of their


representative on North Korea did --


lead rep Tift on North Korea.


We are just in the beginning stages of


building a relationship.


But my counterpart over the past year


has been a tremendous partner, and I'm


looking forward developing the same


modicum of cooperation with their new


representative.


 Sir, given the centralized authority


of North Korean regime, have you


encountered difficulties when working


with your counterparts in the North


Korean diplomatic core having the


initiative and leverage to negotiate on


terms without seeking higher guidance?


 So in any system of government, ours


included, there has to be some


connection to the direction of the


ultimate leadership.


In our case with separate branches


government, that includes me being


attentive to the interests of Congress,


but ultimately I serve at the pleasure


of president, Secretary of State, so I


need to know that what I'm doing is


consistent with the president's


decisions on these policies.


If that's the case in our system, which


is a democratic system in which we have


divided branches government, multiple


voices in the democratic debate, it's


all the more so in the North Korean


system which really is a centralized


rule where chairman Kim Jong-un runs


that country in every dimension.


And as such, as the leader North Korea,


it's incumbent upon him to create the


space that his negotiators have in order


to enter into an discussion with us, in


order to enter into the kind of of


give-and-take that's necessary to


explore solutions of the very


complicated issues like the ones we're


working on now.


But that's also why it was so important


for us to change the trajectory of the


diplomacy on the Korean peninsula with


leader-to-leader engagement.


Hopefully what President Trump can do


with chairman skim give chairman Kim the


confidence that if he opens that space


to his team, that he will find it will


be a fruitful diplomatic process that


will allow us both to Chief Executive


our goals as -- achieve our goals as


laid out in the Singapore summit just a


year ago.


So it is a strictly controlled system.


It's a rigid system.


It is leader driven in its entirety.


But that also is why we think that it's


a very constructive step forward for the


president to engage directly and try to


create that diplomatic space for the


people inside the system.


 As a leader-driven system, it's also


been clear that despite how closed off


it is, we've been able to see that North


Korea is a major violater of human


rights, so in this case and with your


educational, what place does human


rights play in this sort of U.S. policy?


 So the United States, of course,


assigns high value to human rights


around the world.


We have historically.


It's part of the core of who we are.


This has been an issue of some tension


and discussion between the United States


and North Korea over many years.


And it is and remains an issue of


contention.


The United States is not -- has not


listen its voice through resolutions and


international organizations, through


corporation driven reporting process,


and through the kind of designations


that we undertake as the United States


government not only to fulfill our


ideals but to fulfill our laws.


I should also be very clear that my


negotiating priority is not human


rights of North Korea.


My negotiating priority starts with


the elimination of the weapons of mass


descrowcts Korean peninsula.


It sentenced into transforming


relations, it sentenced into creating


more peaceful and stable Korean


peninsula and to addressing some of the


harder edges between our two societies


that trace back all the way to the


Korean war.


In this process we open up space for


discussions on a number of i that have


divided the United States and North


Korea over many, many years.


We've got to start with the highest


priority.


We have to address all of our


interests and ideals.  And, of course,


these negotiations and the United States


needs to continue to give voice to I'm


human rights around the world.


        .


 Sir, do you think that this potential


lowered U.S. operational readiness on


the screek, screek talks need to


progress?


The question from the audience is would


that also be possible to decrease the


overall footprint of the U.S. military


in South Korea in exchange for total


denuclearization.


 We're well away from that, but


certainly in my speech when I talk about


the U.S. military presence can move away


from being a state -- being in a state


of preparedness and training for


perpetual war to playing a constructive


and stabilizing role towards a durable


peace, it includes a lot of strategic


reconsiderations that might be available


to us as we make progress in all the


issues I laid out.


Again, we're a long way away from there.


And I think we have to start with the


objective of solving the problem,


lowering the threat, lowering the risk.


Then we need to leave to it our military


leaders to may be make a sober judgment


on the level of risk and the appropriate


response the United States has an an


allied partner of South Korea.


But, of course, the forces are driven by


the perception of threat.


If we can address the threat, we give


ourselves a lot more options.


 Going back to China, you spoke about


forging ties with North Korea.


Now, in your opinion, would China permit


a border nation that they support to


grow closer with the U.S.?


And if so, how much closer, in your


opinion?


 So I say China is 100% with us some


of the way.


[Laughter]


Not that far.


That is not the way.


We and China, we have a lot of issues,


the miedz and China need to sort out as


China rises and as we try to find a set


of global norms that both of our nations


are willing and able to support and


abide by that will produce an


opportunity for our peoples, our


respective peoples to thrive.


We're not there yet.


That underlies a lot of the issues that


Jenn theme underlies a lot of the issues


and tension with China and those you are


unresolved.


Of course, China not welcome a U.S.


military ally on its border, and the


Chinese have said as much in the past. 


But that's not our goal, either.


So this isn't going to be a major point


of contention.


I think it's fair to say that the


Chinese would judge that a stable and


peaceful relationship between the United


States and North Korea has attend


benefits for the people's republic of


China.


I laid out some of the security benefit


duty also the economic benefits a moment


ago.


The domestic benefits for that Ranger


enormous.


This part of China that neighbors the


Korean peninsula is among the poorest


areas of the people's republic of China.


It's an industrial area, heavy


industries that historically have been


something of the industrial driver of


China, but like so many of our


industrial cities here in the midwest,


time has taken its toll and an infusion


of cross-board trade and economic


invention would be hugely beneficial.


The same for Russia.


One of the most economically challenged


of the Russian federation is the far


east.


Population is in declain client.


Opening frayed and opportunity for that


part of Russia would likewise be hugely


beneficial.


I talked about the opportunities for --


I've talked about today about the


opportunities for South Korea as well


that would evolve from that.  You have


to think about South Korea as an island. 


South Korea is one of the largest


trading nations in the world, but


there's not a single good that comes


into or out of South Korea that isn't on


a ship or an airplane.


There's no land drops.


South Korea is isolated from the rest of


Asia by North Korea.


Imagine the benefits that could come


from an infrastructure that would be


built across the Korean peninsula tying


all of these economically challenged


areas together along with infusions of


international investment, international


trade, the United States would engage


economically.


It's not -- it's a great outcome.


But we have a lot of work to do to get


there.


And it's -- it is a lot of work, and


it's going to take us some time to get


to that point, and the North Koreans are


going to have to decide on what terms


they want to enter that world, if that's


the choice that they make, and we hope


it is.


  All of this is premised upon also


addressing the national security risk,


and as an American diplomat I have to


keep coming back to the central


interests of the United States of


America, which is to address the issue


of weapons of mass destruction on the


Korean peninsula.


None of this vision is going to really


come to fruition if we can't make


progress on that, but we have to


convince the North Koreans is the


benefit of that, is the future for North


Korea for North Korea.


That's what we're trying to do here.


 During your speech you talked about


how the potential forral fail could


result in increase proceed lifer as a in


the regional if North Korea has able to


develop and maintain a successful


nuclear arsenal.


The question is has the administration's


calls for an increased burden sharing or


at least that perception among allies,


cast out on the long term U.S. extended


deterrence policy, and does that have


implications for long-term cooperation.


 We're not there yet and I don't


expect we will get there.


We will work closely with our allies to


try to find a balanced solution to


address usuals of burden sharing that


have plagued the United States with its


alliance partners around the world since


World War II.


The burden-sharing debate didn't begin


in 2017 when President Trump took office   


office.


I cut my teeth in Washington on European


affairs for almost 15 years before I


took on this portfolio.


And I can tell you that the issue of


defense spending in Europe has been a


plague on the U.S. alliance with NATO


practically since its very founding.


And it's just an objective fact that in


many cases the allies don't even meet


the minimal commitment in defense


spending that they committed to achieve


in order to make those alliances real.


The worst thing in the world for us


would be to have an alliance


relationship with a country in which we


were tied to their national defense but


they didn't take adequate steps


themselves to defend themselves.


And so what we want to see from all of


our alliance partners is a full


commitment in that regard.


Certainly, a modicum of stability on the


proliferation front does come from


confidence in the extended deterrence.


But that extended deterrence can be


brought into question for reasons on


hern the failure of thal lions.


NATO was still a viable institution in


the 1980s when the Soviet Union began to


deploy new missile systems that were


designed specifically to sever security


ties between the United States and


Europe.


The Soviet Union sought in the 1980s to


create a scenario in which one or the


other might choose to sit it out in the


case of a war because it really wasn't


their business, what was going on, and


they didn't want to take the hit if they


stuck their nose into it.


President Reagan, work can with many of


our European allies, president mitt


rafned France, chancellor Cole of


Germany, prime minister that Cher in


Britain, made a very controversial


decision to employ the Persian 2


missile, deploy the euro missiles into


Europe to signal the U.S. security


against the face of external threat.


These are the kind of debates that we


put behind us at the end of the cold


war.


We were able to move into a much more


optimistic posture ash the world, but we


have seen the rise of new missile


systems in other parts of the world, and


we've also seen development new


capabilities like those in North Korea


with its weapons of mass destruction.


Any foreign policy, any national


security expert will tell you that this


creates stresses on the strategic


choices that every country in the region


makes.


And that's to everybody's detriment.


We do not want more nuclear weapon


states in the world, full stop.


China doesn't, either.


Russia doesn't want it, either.


So we have to work together even with


countries like China Russia.


We have other areas of disagreement to


sustain also this 50-year commitment of


non-proliferation that arose out of


non-proliferation treaty.


Each time we confront a breach in that,


we face the possibility of a dam burst,


and so it's very much in our interests


to cooperate and succeed not just on the


denuclearization of North Korea North


Korea but in the broader sense in the


full sets of transformational steps that


I described.


I feel like you guys are asking me these


questions.


I know they're coming from all of you.


But these are great questions, and thank


you much, very much for them.


These are all questions that we really


are wrestling this.


These are Reagan     realtime.


You should know that these questions


you're asking are the same ones that are


asked nide is halls of government eye


daily basis, and we have to have answers


to these because these are the stakes.


So thank you.


Please go ahead.


 Let me undertake to say that we have


dozens of questions here.


[Laughter]


And we don't have time to -- for to you


answer them, but we'll undertake to at


least send you the questions so that you


have a sense of the audience and the


sense of what our students are thinking


and others in the audience.


We don't expect an answer, but just to


give you a sense of the rest of the


audience because we're never going to


get to   all the questions.


[Laughter]


Anyway here comes the next question.


 Perfect.


Given the U.S. decision to pull out of


the JCPOA agreement and with the


president calling it a one-sided


transaction, at the same time President


Trump announced a decision to remove


additional sanctions from North Korea


despite having violated UN security


resolution -- violated UN security


resolution and having conducted recent


little before           


ballistic missile tests.


How would you explain the source of


disparate in foreign policy with the


approach between Iran and between North


Korea?


 So just a slight correction.


I don't know if the transcription or a


mistake in perception.


We have not lifted any sanctions against


North Korea at palm in fact, the


sanctions of North Korea by the United


Nations secure council are


comprehensive.


But this comes back to the issue of the


JCP oovment which is the larger issue --


and it is to some degree the question


answered a moment ago.


Let me just say that we're going to have


to do things differently.


The mandate that I have and the mandate


that the international community has


agreed to in the UN security council


resolutions dating back to 2:00 is the 2:00 2006 is


the complete elimination of nuclear


weapons.


It's not the sus tension of uranium to


test if and see if other elements in the


relationship with change.


What we're trying to do with this


diplomacy is transform the relations


with North Korea in a way that also


shifts incentives.  When a country


doesn't feel like it's at risk from


invasion or a threat or hostile policies


week can we work together with them to


also address dangerous technologies like


weapons of mass destruction that


ironically are also the source of that


risk and that hostility.


We've got a lot of work to do with our


counterparts in North Korea to test and


see if this is possible.


But what we're trying to do is much


bigger than the JCPOA represented with


Iran, and it's probably, not to


foreshadow too much what my colleagues,


it's probably very much the nature where


we go with Iran if engagement does, in


fact, begin between us and the Iranians.


 If I could, I'd like to interject a


question to make sure we address a


little bit of what's happening in


Washington and what's different about


this administration.


You've got a lot of experience with the


George h W. and George W. Bush


administrations.


You were serving in Congressional roles


throughout the Clinton years, certainly


following and intimately familiar with


the Obama administration.


Each president is unique but this one is


obviously so in om respects.


And I want you, if you would, to tell as


a little bit about how that empowers you


in diplomacy and what are some ways in


which it causes you to have to adjust to


the way in which you conduct diplomacy.


 Thank you.


In the case of North Korea, it probably


offers some significant examples, to


answer your question, because the


president is personally invested in this


policy.


President Trump very much feels


ownership of the course of our diplomacy


in North Korea.


And he has personally given direction to


me and to my team and to the secretary


of state on where he wants to go and


what he wants to do with this.


As an aside, I am a public servant.


I serve at the pleasure of the president


and Secretary of State.


But I also have to think he's right.


I think what he's trying to do here is


long overdue and I think there's a


chance that we can do it.


And so that's also motivating, is when


you are fully engaged with support of


the policies, professionals in


government work on all sorts of policies


that they don't always agree on.


I have the great opportunity to be right


on the issue in the place I believe.


Now, the advantages that have come from


that, of course, the president in our


system has cleared the space.


The will the has given direction on what


he wants done.


That helps a lot.


We have a big and sprawling government


with a variety of views, well-informed


views and well-substantiated scepticism


or concern about various elements of


policy, but when the president has


provided the direction, that's kind of


empowering, to Zais the least.


The -- say the least.


The president has consistently messaged


to chairman Kim Jong-un his commitment


to do this in a way that, as I


described earlier, in our view is


important to opening up and changing the


direction in North Korea to meet us and


to achieve these goals.


Very important      that's very important.


Every time the president tweets, our


counterparts in North Korea read it


carefully.


They study it closely.


And the president has been consistent in


his messaging about diplomatic


opportunity.


Some challenges do arise from this as


well.


We have -- it's no secret that it's been


challenging to get the North Koreans to


engage at the working level and do the


real daltd negotiations that are going


to be necessary to bring to life, to


bring to reality the vision that the two


leaders have laid out.


They're going to have to work with us.


These are complicated issues that    that


require enormous expertise and


thoughtful, thoughtful exchange in order


to realize solutions that are acceptable


to both sides.


It has to happen.


And that's my message to you today is


we've got to get this going.


It's time for us to get started.  The


North Koreans, not surprisingly, have


wanted to talk to the president, and so


the Hanoi summit was an opportunity


where the North Korean side brought


their ideas directly to the president's


meetings, and unfortunately it


illustrated the challenges of reach an


agreement.


We were unable to reach an agreement.


We haven't done the work necessary to


really test these ideas and get


sufficient feedback on ha was viable and


what wasn't.


The process isn't going to work unless


it's got both the top and the bottom.


The challenge, of course, is when the


president is so directly associated with


it, he's going to own that as well.


It works.


With the totality of circumstances that


we have, it works.


We have space for diplomacy.


We still have time to be able to resolve


these issues.


And I'm confident we can do it.


But I think it's quite clear in both my


remarks and in my answer here, John,


we've got to get going.


      .


 You discussed the good working


relationship that you have with your


counterparts in Russia and China, and


the question from the audience is how


does the isolation of the North Korean


diplomatic personnel working on the


negotiations impact the process and are


there any -- that you can elaborate on?


 I know you didn't ask the question,


but let me address it more generally.


So North Korea has a ministry of foreign


affairs.


It has very skilled diplomats p it's got


seasoned negotiators who have worked


with the United States on these issues


for 25 years.


In fact, some of the very people that


we're working with today in a more


junior capacity were involved in the


first iteration of these negotiations in


the early 1990s.


Framework negotiations they were called


back then.


And so North Korea has a set of skilled


and experienced diplomats.


North Korea has embassies around the


world.


They don't have an embassy here in the


United States of America but they do


have a permanent representation, but the


United Nations and New York, they have


diplomats who live abroad, who work


abroad, and they interact with many


countries around the world on a daily


basis.


  North Korea has a number of -- the


North Korean government has a number of


relationships historically that have


been closer, including China, including


Russia, including some of the other


countries with whom it was in common


cause during cold war.


So Poland and the Czech Republic and


Bulgaria and these countries still to


this day have embassies in Pyongyang as,


incidentally, do the Germans, the


British, the French.


Well, the French have a diplomatic


representation and the Swedes and many


other countries.


So North Korea is definitely an insular


government and it's very difficult for


us to communicate directly with and


speedily.


But but I think both sides know each


other very well and I and I know weave a


lot of experience working together and


there's a lot of work we can do together


      .


 More of a personal question.


As a former we   Wolverine what advice would


you give to a current student to achieve


a career in foreign policy such as


yours?


 You already made the first important


decision.


[Laughter]


Being at   a University of Michigan student.


And I will say this, in all seriousness,


having on my resume at a young age


University of Michigan was a helpful and


impressive credential, even when I had


no experience in anything else.


I can only tell you how I did it, for


whoever is asking me that question, and


there's no one way you can do it.


But what I -- over the course of the


years I had the opportunity to work very


closely with the university in other


capacities.


For many years I was a board member of


the Michigan and Washington program,


which is the university's semester in


Washington program where a cohort of 25


to 30 students will to ... full semester


coursework while interning, working in


the institutional government, none of


profit NGO, in Washington, DC.


For those of you who might be interested


in a career in waisht highly recommend


that program you can still carry a full


class load and you can have a very


interesting career experience that opens


doors for you later.


So I'm no longer on the board of that.


I had to resign when I took this


position.


But the professor from the political


science department now leads that


program.


We have a -- the university has a


permanent team in Washington, DC.


So that's an option.


But I mentor, all of us who are on the


board mentored Michigan students who


came through and gave them career


advice.


My number one piece of career advice for


any student who is getting ready to


purchase sigh career in Washington is


move to Washington.


You can't phone it in.


There is a land of constant opportunity.


Jobs are opening and jobs are being


filled on a constant basis, but being


there is half of it.


You have to take a chance.


But chances are if you're a student at


this university, you have a friend or a


former roommate or a classmate who has


got an apartment, who has got an open


couch.


You can get out there and you can knock


on doors.


Second is ask people for help.


All of us, myself included, somebody


helped give us a leg up in our careers.


When I went out to Washington, DC, I


knocked on doors, some people were kind


enough to sit down, spend a little bit


of time with me, and they did it because


there's a lot of interest in helping


young people and it's a great spirit in


Washington but they also did it in many


cases because that's what someone did


for them when they got their start.


And so they're willing to do it as I'm


willing to do it, as I have done over


many, many years with other students as


well but with a particular bias towards


University of Michigan students.


         .


I guess that's how I got my start.


I started out on Capitol Hill.


And I know the Congress is the subject


of a lot of derision.


I know that the political stalemate and


the caustic nature of our politics takes


some of the shine off of it.


It is a great place to start your


career.


You will find that you can match up with


a member of Congress or senator whose


policies you support, whose issues you


can be passionate about, and it's a


great upwardly mobile place.


Virtually everyone who starts here I


don't know care what your degree,


everyone starts as a staff assistant, a


phone answerer, a secretary, but the


advancement is fast because there's


constant turnover as young people are


moving to other jobs, other


opportunities, grad school and oh on.


It was a great place for me to start and


that worked for me.


But there's other great ways to start


your job.


Of course, the sphorn service exam for


those of you who are interested in


international relations, take the


foreign service exam.


It's the doorway into our professional


diplomatic core.


And by the way, it's a start to a


tremendous career opportunity,


particularly for young people to see a


lot of the world and to work on behalf


of their country.


So I commend that to you as well.


  I'm not going to go on too much more


with that, but you have a lot of great


reseizures sources in the university --


resources in the university.


My search started at the career planning


office.


I looked at the public service


internship program.


We didn't have the Michigan in


Washington seminar program when I was a


student here, but it's a tremendous


resource for the student body now.


You have a lot of options.


Just have to go out and find them.


        .


 Sir, given the public nature of the


ongoing negotiations and difficult


problems, implications across the U.S.


interagency team, can you expand on your


role, especially unique role how it


interacts with its national security


experts broader U.S. government.


 The national security council plays a


hugely important role in this, in any


foreign policy issue.


It is the location where all the views


of the agencies are consolidated and


synthesize into what want you hopes is a


coherent policy, and so we have a


process inside the national security


council that I attend on behalf of the


department of state at times usually


with the deputy Secretary of State.


For those of you who are a little bit


more informed of the ways of Washington,


you know that the MSC actually is a


stratified organization.  It has the


principles, which is a national security


adviser, the Secretary of State,


secretary defense, CIA director.


It's got to departments which are the


number 2ness each of those agencies and


it's got a whole set of foreign policy


professionals in different rairchtionz


assistant scerts, deputy assistant


secretaries, et cetera.


So it's a layer dollars process and


ultimately at the top is the national


security council, and really the


national security council is not the MSC


staff.


National security council is the


president of the United States with his


or her national security team


surrounding them to discuss issues.


So that process brings all those views


from all those agencies in, and my


issue, the issue I work on cuts cross


eye lot of parts of of the federal


government.


North Korea touches on economics and


trade and sanctions, treasury


department, Congress department are


deeply involved in North Korea policy.


Of course the Department of Defense, all


of the attendant issues related to


nation security.


If presence of U.S. troops the in Korean


peninsula to our deterrent on the Korean


peninsula.


We have a lot of parts of the department


of state hav to come to the table


through our deputy secretary John


Sullivan or myself at these meetings.


Then, of course, you of the NFC staff


which is comprised of a lot of


professionals.


Not surprisingly, there are differences


views.


There   People have different responsibilities.


They have different experiences.


They have different points of view.


And the goal of the NFC is to coherently


forge that into a set of policies that


can be recommended to the president of


the United States.


On its a push and a pull.


I talked about my issue and the issue


I've been asked to serve, North Korea,


as one that has a lot of push because


the president has set out what he wants


food.


What we're trying to do is how to


succeed in the plam terrace of the


president how they play out for North


Korean policy.


      .  Of    This can be consent shus.


It has been across administrations.  You


have people here in this room with me


who, like me, have served at these


levels of government and have


participated in that process.


Obviously, it should be easy.


These are heady issues.


These are important issues.


We want to hear a wide set of points of


view.


I think it serves the president, serves


the country to have those all vetted.


And our North Korea policy, I think we


have a strong policy and I think we're


serving the president very well.


 Now, given the timing of the -- of


the Vietnam summit and considering the


fact that not long afterwards North


Korea began to test more short-range


missiles, what effect have those actions


by the North Koreans had on our most


recent educational with them?


-- our most recent educational       dealings with them?


 So our view is that the most


important thing we can do in North Korea


is to set aside any vestiges of hostel


behavior and engage in the kind of


diplomacy that's going to be necessary


to build a stronger understanding and a


address the full range of the threats


and risk on the Korean panes law.


We     peninsula.


In recent weeks and recent months there


has been a lot of talk about short range


ballistic missiles by a of the North


Korean test, but this is against a


backdrop of a system that's also tested


intermediate range ballistic missiles,


intercontinental ballistic missiles,


that is clearly in possession of nuclear


ceaps with the demonstrated testing that


has been done a couple of years ago,


that's been reaching nuclear materials


in order to -- raw material in order to


build weapons.


And also it's widely reported to have


chemical and biological weapons


programs.


So the threat is there.


The risk is there.


The challenge is to find a way through


diplomacy to resolve it.


And the president has made clear that


the short range ballistic missiles don't


make him heap but it's not going to


disrupt our efforts in order to engage


diplomacy to resolve the very issues


that we're referring to.


So these are the kind of of things,


though, that also challenge the


diplomatic space we have in which we


have to operate weeks expo there's a, and so


there's a whole set of circumstances we


have to manage bilaterally, at home,


domestically in the interaction with


our corporation, with our press, with


our expert community in national


security.


It's a surprise maintain, and --


[Laughter]


-- and we're just going to do our very


best to work with it help?


This is the last question from the


audience.


As you seek and the administration seeks


transformational change between the


relationship between the U.S. and North


Korea, if you could just speak or expand


on the importance of verification


monitoring and what steps are being


taken in the process to ensure that


actions are enforceable in the final


agreement.


 We haven't gotten to a point in


negotiations where we have discussed in


detail an agreement on verification


measures.


But suffice it to say, meaningful and


verifiable steps are going to be


necessary for us to be convince that had


we have made the progress that we need


to make on the elimination of weapons of


mass destruction.


It's not going to be easy.


Again, it's going to be another issue


that's going to be challenging for us to


resolve.


But there's an absolute international


consensus, including our partners in


China and Russia that verification has


to be part of any meaningful steps on


denuclearization.


We're going to have to work to figure


out how to do that.


That's something that's going to be an


important part of our negotiation, but


we don't have an agreement yet that


would lead me to the confidence to say


that we can do that.


 So just a question about process,


which is often very important for


foreign policy.


Could you talk a little bit about your


team.


You've mentioned your team.


Who are they?


And how do you -- what do you do day by


day?


What's sort of the pace of work when


you're dealing with an issue like this,


which is very tight and focused?


 Let me take this as an opportunity to


give credit where credit's due.


      The president has obviously


entrusted and the Secretary of State has


entrusted in me an important priority in


U.S. national security, but I could not


do this with without a team of


professionals working with me both


inside my organization, inside the


department of state, but also we have a


second team.


We really have two teams.


The second one is our negotiating team.


On the first inside the department of


state you have a mixed of foreign


service officers of civil service


experts in their field and also some


people who came from outside, political


appointees in the department, and they


work tirelessly.


There's a tremendous, tremendously


talented, motivated group of people,


many of them young, and the hours they


work and the commitment they make and


the rewards, financial rewards compared


to my experience in the private sector,


it's just intimidating to see, really


tremendous talents.


We get -- don't ever lose faith in your


government.


We get the best and the brightest and we


have a bunch of them, and I'm fortunate


to have them on my team working on this


issue on behalf you all, on behalf of


our secretary and our president, on


behalf of our people.


We have a negotiating team that we


brought onboard.


We have saw the to draw from the best


resources across the government.


So we have the best gliewpt United


States government.


We have the chief scientist of the


department of energy and the University


of Michigan graduate, I found out.


I have two Ohio state Buckeyes on my


team.


[Laughter]


Who are tremendous, incidentally.


We have representatives at the


department of treasure.


We have representatives at the


Department of Defense.


And we brought all this to bear in our


discussions with the North Koreans.


We invited them to engage us with the


same level of expertise in the same


breath, and to date I can tell you one


of the frustrations has been that the


North Koreans have not brought the same


level of expertise to the table, and as


a consequence we know a lot more about


some of the things that we're


negotiating with that are in their


country than they have known at the


table, and that makes it challenging


too.


But it's always an honor to serve our


country, and I am deeply grateful to the


president and the Secretary of State for


giving me this opportunity.


For me, it's a return to government.


For those men and women who are


tirelessly working every day, my hat's


off to them.


It is a great great team.


 This is wonderful and we greatly


appreciate you sharing all of these


insights.


I particularly appreciate the fact that


you have discussed a whole number of


different levels or are forums in which


diplomacy occurs.


It occurs working with your team in a


complex interagency process in a set of


relationships with alloys, ultimately


also, of course, with the nowshans North


Koreans.


In a moment I'll ask the audience to


join me in thanking you.


First I want to thank the Weitzer family


again for making possible for the Ford


school to welcome leaders in the


practice of foreign affairs to come to


campus and share insights that we are


sure are very helpful to those of you


who are interested until the topic or


those of you who plan to be


practitioners yourselves.


The second is to draw your attention


again, as Dean Michael said at the


outset, to the array of activity we have


coming this fall and beyond.


We have a simple website to remember,


diplomacyUmichigan.edu.


Come visit us in Weill hall.


Come is on see many of the other


interesting events we have from public


forums to student-focused simulations


and workshops and a whole array of other


opportunities that the Weiser diplomacy


center is able to make available for the


University have Michigan community.


And so in a moment we'll start a


reception across the hall, but before we


head over there, can you please Ontario


me in thanking Steve bieng for being


here.


[Applause]