UM-Ann Arbor Midwest Theory Conference
Preliminary Program for the Fall 1998
Midwest Theory Conference
October 9-11, 1998
Friday (October 9), 1998 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.
Auction I -- Chair: Ennio Stacchetti ennio@umich.edu
(Michigan) -- Room 0530
Final Jeopardy
Bid Rotation and Collusion in Repeated Auctions
Equilibrium Price Paths in Sequential Auctions with Stochastic Supply
High Bids and Broke Winners, Financial Constraint and Default Risk
Reputation -- Chair: Lones Smith lones@umich.edu
(Michigan) -- Room 0550
Learning and the market for information
A dynamic approach to struggling for rights
Whistle blowing and false accusations
Entry, Exit, and Imperfect Competition in the Long Run
Saturday (October 10) 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.
*** Continental Breakfast ***
Saturday (October 10) 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.
Noncooperative Matching -- Chair: Steve Williams srw@srwilliams.econ.uiuc.edu
(Illinois at UC) -- Room 0530
The Market for Access to Trading Partners, Brokers, and Price Determination
A Model of Exchange where Beauty is in the Eye of the Beholder
Psychological Games, Decision Theory -- Chair: Prajit Dutta pkd1@columbia.edu
(Columbia) -- Room 0550
Stochastic independence and uncertainty aversion
Persistent heuristics
Kindness is the parent of kindness - modeling reciprocity
Saturday (October 10) 11:00 - 12:30
Mechanism Design -- Chair: Nicholas Yannelis nyanneli@uiuc.edu
(Illinois at UC) -- Room 0530
Dynamic Stability of Nash-Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms: Reconciling Theory
and Experiments
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
Network Economics -- Chair: Giuseppe Lopomo glopomo@stern.nyu.edu
(NYU) -- Room 0550
Electronic Commerce and Two Stage Search
The Dynamics of Price Regulation
Saturday (October 10) 1:30 - 3:30 p.m.
Auction II -- Chair: Peter Klibanoff peterk@nwu.edu
(Northwestern) -- Room 0530
Equilibrium in Multi-Object Auction with Increasing Returns
Trade at a Market-Clearing Price in the k-Double Auction is Worst-Case Asymtotic
Optimal
On coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible allocations
Complementarities and Collusion in Auctions with Multiple Objects
Learning and Evolutionary Game Theory -- Chair: Quan Wen wen@uwindsor.ca
(Windsor) -- Room 0550
Learning to defect
Payoff Assesments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice
Learning in games by random sampling
Darwinian stability in (small and) large populations
Saturday (October 10) 4:00 - 6:00 p.m.
Experimental Game Theory -- Chair: Yan Chen yanchen@umich.edu
(Michigan) -- Room 0530
An experimental comparison of the fairness and learning hypothesis
An experimental comparison of performance in two strategically isomorphic institutions
An Experimental Test of the Coase Conjecture
Research and Development -- Chair: Lise Vesterlund vester@iastate.edu
(Iowa State) -- Room 0550
Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: the Tale of University Licensing
A general linear model of contests
Dan Kovenock* Kovenock@mgmt.purdue.edu
(Purdue), Michael R. Baye (Indiana), Casper de Vries
(Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus)
Choice between product and process R&D
Innovation-Blocking activities in the theory of Schumpeterian Growth
Elias Dinopoulus* dinopoe@dale.cba.ufl.edu
(Florida), Paul Segerstrom (Michigan State) and Constantinos
Syropoulos (Florida International)
Saturday (October 11) 6:00 p.m.
*** Reception *** - Executive Residence Lounge
Sunday (October 11) 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.
*** Continental Breakfast ***
Sunday (October 11) 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.
Public Goods -- Chair: Ping Wang pxw4@psu.edu
(Penn State) -- Room 0530
Coasian Equilibrium
The informational value of sequential fundraising
Choice Correspondences for Public Goods
Bargaining -- Chair: Tayfun Sonmez tsonmez@umich.edu
(Michigan) -- Room 0550
Unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining Models
The Role of Risk Aversion in Assymetric Stochastic Bargaining
Sunday (October 11) 11:00 - 12:30 p.m.
General Equilibrium -- Chair: John Conley jpconley@uiuc.edu
(Illinois at UC) -- Room 0530
Production Externalities and Urban Configuration
Ping Wang* pxw4@psu.edu (Penn State), Marcus
Berliant (WashU) and Shin-Kun Peng
Incentive compatibility and robustness of competitive equilibrium
1-genericity and aggregate excess demand
Development and Growth -- Chair: Elias Dinopoulus dinopoe@dale.cba.ufl.edu
(Florida) -- Room 0550
Ability, Mobility, Inequality and Human Capital Accumulation
Sharecropping, Land Exploitation, and Land Improving Investments