Rami Khouri: Understanding the new power equations throughout the Middle East

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>> Bob Axelrod: Welcome and good afternoon.

[00:00:03.296]
I'm Bob Axelrod, Walgreen Professor for
the Study of Human Understanding here

[00:00:08.656]
in the Ford School and in the
Department of Political Science.

[00:00:11.966]
It's my pleasure to welcome you all here today
on behalf of the International Policy Center

[00:00:16.786]
at Ford and our co-sponsor today,
The Center for the Middle East,

[00:00:20.836]
Middle Eastern and North African Studies.

[00:00:23.476]
And as -- we're pleased to Rami Khouri here
today and I look forward to your talk very much

[00:00:29.986]
but before we hear from him
let me introduce Norman Bishara

[00:00:33.686]
who will tell you a little
bit more about our speaker.

[00:00:35.506]
Norman is an Assistant Professor of Business
Law and Ethics at the Ross School of Business.

[00:00:42.046]
He has a master's degree in
public policy from the Ford School

[00:00:45.866]
and he's also chair of the
Ford School Alumni Board.

[00:00:48.016]
He holds a law degree from Cornell
and he currently conducts research

[00:00:52.046]
on cooperative governments,
international legal reform,

[00:00:55.976]
and business ethics in the developing world.

[00:00:58.496]
He's also a project consultant with the
Lebanese Transparency Association in Beirut

[00:01:03.266]
where he co-authored the first Lebanese
Code of Cooperative Governments.

[00:01:07.816]
Norm, I give you the pleasure
of introducing our speaker.

[00:01:10.636]
[00:01:16.636]
>> Norman Bishara: Thanks, Bob, and thanks,
special thanks to of course the Center

[00:01:20.826]
for Middle East and North African Studies and
to the International Policy Center, Jan Svejnar,

[00:01:24.366]
the Director who couldn't be here today but also
special thanks to Zana Kwaiser who is on staff

[00:01:29.056]
at the Center and who put together all of the
details of Rami's visit from start to finish.

[00:01:33.916]
We're lucky to have Rami Khouri here.

[00:01:35.856]
He comes to us from Beirut by way of Boston
which gives you a sense of how much he travels.

[00:01:41.076]
He, if you can construe Rami's
career and professional --

[00:01:45.846]
personal and professional lives you can sort
of look at it in terms of a long journey.

[00:01:50.006]
He grew up in Switzerland
and the U.S. and Jordan.

[00:01:54.086]
He now lives in Beirut.

[00:01:55.696]
He is often in the U.S. He is affiliated with
several universities and great policy schools,

[00:02:02.856]
the Kennedy School, Fletcher -- the Fletcher
School at Tufts, Syracuse's Maxwell School,

[00:02:09.046]
as well as Harvard's Kennedy School.

[00:02:11.656]
And University of Chicago's Harris School
as well, I don't know if I mentioned that.

[00:02:15.336]
But in practice he's still a
journalist as he is by training.

[00:02:18.656]
He holds two degrees, an undergraduate and
a graduate degree from Syracuse University

[00:02:23.556]
and as a journalist he still practices.

[00:02:25.436]
He contributes at least two
pieces per week in syndication.

[00:02:30.396]
I don't know if you saw his most recent New
York Times op ed piece but it is a must read.

[00:02:35.016]
And- but many of you know him through
that writing but you also know him

[00:02:37.976]
through other outlets so you may have
seen him on not only in the New York Times

[00:02:42.176]
but you see him on various U.S.
shows such as the Charlie Rose Show

[00:02:45.976]
or you may recognize his voice for the
Diane Rehm Show where is often contributing

[00:02:50.316]
to the Friday news roundup
in the International Section.

[00:02:55.196]
But Rhami is a bit more than that.

[00:02:56.666]
He is also the Director of the Issam Fares
Center at the American University in Beirut

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and the Founding Director which really gives
you a sense of how much influence he has there,

[00:03:03.556]
not just in journalism but also
as a policy maker in the region.

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In that sense, he often is seen as the voice
of the Middle East translating really difficult

[00:03:12.026]
and complex Middle East policy problems
for audiences all over the world,

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particularly in the U.S. Not an easy task
to stay impartial but to be still be candid

[00:03:21.316]
and critical and yet very deeply respected.

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So we're very lucky to have
him here today and I now turn

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over the mic to our guest, Rhami Khouri.

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Thank you.

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( Applause )

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>> Rhami Khouri: Thank you.

[00:03:39.296]
Thank you very much Norm and Bob.

[00:03:43.266]
Thank you for having me here.

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I'm delighted to be at the
University of Michigan.

[00:03:48.306]
I was trying to time my visit
so I can catch a football game

[00:03:51.236]
or a basketball game and
it didn't work very well.

[00:03:54.486]
They told me that there's a hockey game outdoors
Saturday so I'm getting out of here tonight.

[00:03:59.236]
So I'm into American sports but I'm not sure
I could quite handle that but I will be back

[00:04:05.056]
and watch a football game and congratulations
for getting into a bowl game this year again.

[00:04:10.596]
Your team, like mine, Syracuse, is on the
up and up again, so the future is bright.

[00:04:16.646]
I want to thank the International Policy
Center and the Center for Middle Eastern

[00:04:21.546]
and North African Studies for co-hosting this
and particularly Norm Bishara and Zana Kwaiser

[00:04:29.066]
for all their work and having this happen
and I'm delighted to be here with old friends

[00:04:38.326]
and family, cousins, and
friends from high school days

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and acquaintances from over the years.

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And I'm, as Norm mentioned,
I'm a journalist by background.

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I've spent about 40 years working in the Middle
East, mostly -- totally in the Middle East.

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Working as a journalist, reporting,
writing, analyzing, observing,

[00:05:01.866]
trying to understand what's happening
in the Middle East and I'm --

[00:05:06.076]
in late middle age I decided to try to gain
some respectability and moved into academia

[00:05:10.756]
so I'm masquerading as a semi-academic
by running this policy institute

[00:05:15.276]
at The American University of Beirut.

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But I'm really here to share with you
my analyses and ideas that I generate

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from my journalistic work which primarily means
going around the region, talking to people all

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over the Middle East, interacting with all
kinds of people from all levels of society

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and all different kinds of countries, going to
Iran, going to the Arab-Israeli conflict areas,

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Israel, Palestine, all over the region.

[00:05:47.216]
I've traveled in the last 40 years and
I've watched the development of the region

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from inside the Middle East in the last
four decades or so and I'd like to share

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with you my analysis of what I
believe is actually going on in terms

[00:06:02.776]
of the new power equations
that are emerging in our region

[00:06:08.006]
which are woefully almost criminally
underreported in this country.

[00:06:12.576]
As those of you who follow
the Middle East probably know

[00:06:15.806]
that the American press is not very good at
covering the realities of the Middle East.

[00:06:20.266]
It tends to be superficial, biased,
ideologically driven, emotionally exaggerated,

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and has many faults and I know this from working
with many colleagues in the American media.

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And the American media does some excellent
reporting but not on the Middle East,

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unfortunately, not on the Arab-Israeli
conflict, not on the Arab World,

[00:06:40.006]
and now, not on the Islamic world either.

[00:06:42.876]
So I would like to try to possibly
give you a more accurate view possibly,

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maybe a more complete view, a more nuanced view

[00:06:52.556]
of what I believe is actually
going on in the region.

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And I think there are some really very important
things that are going on that have been going

[00:07:00.886]
on for the last 20 years or so and
that deserve much more I think accurate

[00:07:08.316]
and dispassionate analysis.

[00:07:10.596]
The area I'm talking about is
essentially the Arab world mainly

[00:07:16.506]
but what I'm saying also applies to a little bit
to Turkey and Iran and Israel, in some cases,

[00:07:22.626]
but I'm mainly talking about,
about the Arab world at one level

[00:07:27.816]
and other things, slightly broader perspective.

[00:07:31.386]
But when you look at the Middle East, you
essentially I believe have four players;

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the Arabs, the Israeli's,
the Turks, and the Iranians.

[00:07:40.896]
You also have -- those are the four indigenous
players and you have external players.

[00:07:46.796]
The United States is now engaged in two wars
in the region, has 20 or 30 military bases all

[00:07:52.466]
over the area and so the U.S.
is a major player as well now.

[00:07:58.466]
And some of the other foreign forces -
the Europeans, the Russians, the Chinese -

[00:08:03.486]
are there in economic terms, cultural terms,
political, military, and different ways

[00:08:08.086]
but essentially we're talking about Arabs,
Turks, Iranians, and Israelis who interact

[00:08:12.836]
to create the realities that
are defining our region today.

[00:08:18.916]
The first point I want to make is that
all of the realities of our region,

[00:08:23.406]
every dimension of life in the Middle East and
certainly in the Arab world is in the process

[00:08:29.106]
of significant and ongoing change.

[00:08:32.096]
This is a region that is often portrayed in the
Western and American media, is often portrayed

[00:08:41.456]
as one-dimensional, as, you
know, the Arabs are like that.

[00:08:45.436]
The Muslims are like that.

[00:08:46.606]
This is how they are and this is
how we have to deal with them.

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The reality is that this region is
neither monolithic in its behavior

[00:08:54.876]
or attitudes or thinking nor is it static.

[00:08:58.336]
It's constantly evolving.

[00:09:00.846]
Every level of society and I would mention
six; the citizen, this community, the society,

[00:09:08.416]
the government, the country as a whole, the
region of the Middle East, and the Middle East,

[00:09:14.286]
and the world -- those six levels of
analysis, every one of them is in the process

[00:09:19.526]
of significant and ongoing change.

[00:09:23.656]
All of these dimensions have been changing
I believe most seriously since the end

[00:09:29.776]
of the Cold War, about 20 years ago and I can
see there's some people in this room, like me,

[00:09:35.226]
old enough to remember the Cold War.

[00:09:37.546]
And as you know, around 1990 when the
Cold War ended there were a lot of changes

[00:09:43.266]
around the world and there were a lot of
changes triggered by the end of the Cold War

[00:09:49.646]
in the Middle East except for
really two major changes --

[00:09:55.426]
foreign military interventions didn't
end and no democracy took place.

[00:10:00.846]
No democrat-- no democratic
transformation took place

[00:10:03.916]
in the Middle East unlike
much of the rest of the world.

[00:10:07.246]
But the -- all the main aspects of life started
to evolve because of the end of the Cold War,

[00:10:15.596]
because of economic pressures,
because some Arabs,

[00:10:18.446]
Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel.

[00:10:21.236]
There were a combination of reasons why this
region started to evolve more dynamically

[00:10:27.716]
and what happened really in the early
1990's really started in the late,

[00:10:31.676]
in the 1980's with the economic
pressures and the --

[00:10:36.486]
which forced some governments to liberalize
in the Arab world, not democratize

[00:10:40.596]
but to liberalize, to open up and to allow their
people more space to behave as normal people

[00:10:46.226]
in politics, in economics, in culture, in
arts, and the different aspects of life.

[00:10:51.016]
What happened was that a whole series of
forces were unleashed in Arab societies

[00:10:57.106]
where people could express
themselves a little bit more openly,

[00:11:00.656]
be involved in civil society
groups, maybe vote in an election,

[00:11:04.186]
and speak out in the media more openly.

[00:11:07.726]
And you had essentially the
what I call the resumption

[00:11:13.796]
of history happened in, around
1990 in the Arab World.

[00:11:18.686]
That a region that had been frozen essentially
politically and ideologically was frozen

[00:11:23.576]
for half a century because of the Cold
War and the Arab-Israeli conflict,

[00:11:27.036]
in the early 90's started to evolve again.

[00:11:29.406]
And forces that had always been there
-- religious sentiment, tribal forces,

[00:11:33.646]
private sector, civil society, democracy,
women's movements, groups, socials, artists,

[00:11:38.486]
students -- all of these things all existed in
society but all had been suppressed by the lids

[00:11:45.246]
that had been holding this region static,
the lids of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

[00:11:51.426]
the state building imperative, the Cold War,

[00:11:54.056]
and the emergence of the Modern
Arab Security State in the 1970's.

[00:11:58.346]
All of these things, all of these
things kept the region relatively static

[00:12:03.926]
and as these lids came off one by one, the
region resumed a normal evolutionary process

[00:12:12.676]
where individuals and groups and all kinds
of people in society started to behave

[00:12:18.446]
like people do in a normal society to
express themselves, to mobilize, to organize,

[00:12:23.106]
to challenge authority, to express ideas,
to work for change, to have a resumption

[00:12:29.076]
of history, to have a normal historical
process of change and transformation going on.

[00:12:33.836]
And now we can see some -- a few things that
we couldn't really see before very clearly.

[00:12:40.026]
We could see them, they were under the surface
but now they're up, out into the public.

[00:12:44.296]
First of all, people are expressing what
they feel in various ways, in the media

[00:12:48.846]
and public opinion polls,
occasionally in voting.

[00:12:51.946]
They are expressing themselves more clearly.

[00:12:54.776]
We can see the main players in society.

[00:12:57.886]
Who are the actors now in Arab
society and there is many of them.

[00:13:02.256]
Religious groups, tribal groups, business
groups, government people, political people,

[00:13:06.206]
artists, cultural -- there are
all kinds of people who are active

[00:13:08.996]
in society and now you can see the actors.

[00:13:11.146]
Before they were mostly suppressed unless
they were authorized by the government

[00:13:16.766]
and we can see the connections between
different aspects of life, economic pressure,

[00:13:23.966]
political pressure, ideological
issues, environmental stress,

[00:13:28.106]
all the different aspects of
life within these countries.

[00:13:31.146]
And then regional issues --
the Arab-Israeli conflict,

[00:13:33.936]
relations with Iran, foreign
armies coming at us.

[00:13:37.266]
You can now see the connections between these.

[00:13:39.696]
We see the stakes that are -- we, we
know what's at stake now very clearly

[00:13:45.356]
because people are expressing their concerns
and there's a more active political, cultural,

[00:13:51.606]
economic, and social dialog
taking place in these societies.

[00:13:55.296]
And therefore we have what I believe is a new
configuration of power in the region which is,

[00:14:06.736]
which I would summarize by basically saying
there are three conglomerations of power,

[00:14:13.696]
legitimacy, and authority that are now
active and you can see these three groups

[00:14:19.096]
in the shorthand that I call the
market, the monarch, and the mosque.

[00:14:24.406]
The market is the business sector,
private enterprise, civil society --

[00:14:30.876]
all of these groups who work
independently in society.

[00:14:34.046]
The monarch is the political authority, whether
it's a Republic or a Kingdom or an Emirate,

[00:14:39.836]
it doesn't matter what's the form of
government but the political authority

[00:14:43.616]
with its multiple layers of security
guards and military groups and police

[00:14:47.806]
and armies and intelligence agencies.

[00:14:49.566]
They have massive security complexes that
now define the modern Arab security state

[00:14:55.636]
and all of the people linked to
the governing power in society.

[00:15:00.866]
That's what I call the monarch for short.

[00:15:03.386]
And the mosque is the religious, tribal,
ethnic identities that, not the private sector,

[00:15:10.996]
not the government, but these other groups
in society that are extremely strong,

[00:15:15.916]
are now much more organized and working openly.

[00:15:20.116]
And between the market, the monarch, and
the mosque, you now have three broad centers

[00:15:27.166]
of power, legitimacy, and authority
that represent huge sectors of society.

[00:15:33.096]
They're not exactly evenly matched.

[00:15:34.966]
In some places the government,
the monarch, is dominant.

[00:15:38.476]
In some cases, the market is dominant.

[00:15:40.356]
In some cases, the mosque and the
religious tribal groups are dominant.

[00:15:44.466]
But these three are now creating, are engaged
now in a process which I believe is historic

[00:15:51.806]
and significant in this region and
is still evolving which is a balance

[00:15:57.066]
of power among three major power centers that
provides an informal form of checks and balances

[00:16:05.866]
and that provides also something else which
I believe is the rebirth or maybe we can talk

[00:16:12.196]
about the birth of politics in the Arab world.

[00:16:14.796]
For the first time in modern history, we have
serious contestation of power and legitimacy

[00:16:20.756]
and authority among groups that are operating
in public that are anchored in local society

[00:16:27.406]
that have huge numbers of people that they
represent that are seen to be legitimate,

[00:16:33.706]
that are seen to be responsible,
powerful, and credible actors

[00:16:41.306]
in society, seen by their own people.

[00:16:44.146]
And they are all, all of this
is now happening in public.

[00:16:48.046]
If you're in the Middle East, if you
take the time to observe what's going on,

[00:16:52.356]
you will see all of these things happening.

[00:16:56.176]
And what I think is important for us
to do is to understand what this means.

[00:17:02.876]
I am -- the title of my talk is Rights,
Respect, Resistance, and Righteousness:

[00:17:09.806]
The New Middle East Power Equations.

[00:17:12.476]
Rights, respect, resistance, and righteousness
I believe are four words that capture some

[00:17:19.636]
of the key themes that drive many
of these actors as well as driving,

[00:17:27.466]
as well as driving some of the
foreign forces that intervene

[00:17:33.016]
in our societies including the American
government and army and the British

[00:17:37.206]
and Europeans and, and, and many others.

[00:17:40.266]
But first of all, I think we have to
ask ourselves how did we get here?

[00:17:46.336]
We got here by looking at -- we can understand
how we got here by looking at a quick overview

[00:17:55.256]
of the last 30 or 40 years and I would mention
a few, I'll give you just 10 headline ideas

[00:18:06.006]
about what forces or what criteria or conditions
defined most of the Arab world for most

[00:18:14.776]
of the last two or three generations.

[00:18:17.496]
The first is that this is the only chronically

[00:18:20.606]
and collectively non-Democratic
region in the world.

[00:18:23.636]
Nowhere in the Arab world do you have a
credible, serious Democratic process at play

[00:18:28.646]
and while after the end of the Cold War you
had Democratic transformations in many parts

[00:18:33.286]
of the world, we had none in the Arab
world and this is an important factor.

[00:18:37.606]
The second point is that most
of the states in the Arab world

[00:18:43.216]
in one way or another are weak states.

[00:18:46.706]
They're, they're strong governments and the
states exist and have been there for a while

[00:18:53.256]
and will hang around for a while but
they are getting weaker in many cases

[00:18:57.606]
because the authority of the central
government no longer dominates all of society

[00:19:01.956]
as it used to 30 and 40 years ago.

[00:19:05.306]
The third point is that the legitimacy
of many of the governing powers

[00:19:09.276]
in the Arab world is being
slowly -- fraying at the edges.

[00:19:15.006]
It's not disappearing.

[00:19:16.206]
You still have strong, legitimate,
central governments with huge armies,

[00:19:20.856]
multiple security agencies,
tremendous economic power,

[00:19:24.446]
control of media resources
and many other things.

[00:19:28.026]
But the legitimacy of these institutions of
the central power are fraying at the edges

[00:19:33.166]
as many other people emerge in society and play
the role that the government normally plays

[00:19:38.566]
which is to provide people with security,
with representation, with a sense of hope

[00:19:43.326]
for the future, and a range of
basic services whether it's water,

[00:19:46.756]
education, jobs, or whatever it may be.

[00:19:49.436]
So the legitimacy of many central government
authorities and governments is fraying somewhat.

[00:19:58.236]
[00:20:01.056]
The fourth point is that this is a region
under tremendous demographic stress.

[00:20:06.866]
They -- we now have about 350 million Arabs.

[00:20:09.936]
In 1930 there was around 60
million, a massive growth,

[00:20:14.136]
highest population growth rate in the world.

[00:20:17.136]
30, 40 years ago, the Arab world was mostly
old people, middle age or old people,

[00:20:24.026]
living in rural areas, poorly
served in basic services.

[00:20:32.676]
Today the Arab world is 65%
urban, it's mostly urban.

[00:20:38.016]
It's mostly young people about 65% to 68% of
the Arab population is under the age of 30.

[00:20:44.026]
And these are people whose basic
needs are pretty well met now.

[00:20:47.496]
The state building from the 1930's to the 1980's
provided a very strong infrastructural base

[00:20:53.376]
so most people in the Arab world, especially
in cities and towns can walk to a hospital

[00:20:59.566]
or clinic and walk to their school, can walk

[00:21:02.096]
to a fresh water source, that
basic services are there.

[00:21:06.506]
It's a young, urban, well-served
population or decently served population

[00:21:14.246]
which is tremendously politically frustrated
because it doesn't enjoy political rights

[00:21:20.036]
to any significant degree and is
increasingly concerned about environmental

[00:21:23.626]
and economic stress and therefore you
have this tremendous demographic pressure

[00:21:28.056]
from within society which drives
many of the forces that we're seeing.

[00:21:31.676]
The fifth point is environmental stress.

[00:21:34.296]
This is a region in which
environmental management

[00:21:37.416]
by the governments has been not very good, by
and large, to the point now where we're starting

[00:21:43.446]
to see in countries like Iraq and Syria
and other places, environmental refugees,

[00:21:48.246]
internally displaced environmental
refugees who are moving simply

[00:21:51.546]
because they can no longer
live in their communities.

[00:21:53.876]
The water has run out, the land is
no good for farming, or other reasons

[00:21:58.016]
and you're seeing this now in countries.

[00:22:00.596]
And, you, in a recent poll done of young people
by Gallup, it's about 18% of young people

[00:22:07.856]
between the ages of 15 and 29 said that they
expect to have to move their place of residence

[00:22:12.906]
in the next five years because of environmental
stress, only because of environmental factors,

[00:22:17.926]
so environmental conditions are a big problem.

[00:22:20.846]
Widening disparities is a problem that
we are seeing all over the region,

[00:22:25.766]
particularly in economic terms with small
groups of very wealthy, well-serviced people

[00:22:30.556]
and growing, growing numbers of
people who are more, more poor.

[00:22:34.986]
The seventh main thing we can see in the
region is a tradition of foreign armies

[00:22:40.706]
that keep coming into the region.

[00:22:43.246]
The foreign armies, since the
days of Napoleon, will rationalize

[00:22:48.346]
and justify why they come into our region.

[00:22:50.996]
The reality is from the receiving end

[00:22:52.736]
in the Arab world most people
are fed up with foreign armies.

[00:22:55.416]
They don't think they should
be coming at us regularly

[00:22:58.816]
and they don't think they make things
better but they make things worse.

[00:23:02.876]
The eighth point is the unresolved
Arab-Israeli conflict

[00:23:06.256]
which remains I believe the
most important destabilizing

[00:23:09.786]
and radicalizing force in the region.

[00:23:12.596]
The Palestinian exile now is five or six years
longer than the ancient Jewish Babylonian exile

[00:23:19.066]
and the Palestinians in exile are
now acting like the Babylonian exiles

[00:23:23.306]
which is recreating the consciousness of
a nation in exile and therefore a nation

[00:23:29.146]
that will find its way back home
and restore its national rights.

[00:23:32.936]
The mentality of exile of the Palestinians
into the third generation now in Palestine

[00:23:38.286]
as in Babylon has created a psychological and a
political condition which is redrawing the map

[00:23:46.756]
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and you see in the
behavior of groups like Hezbollah and Hamas,

[00:23:51.946]
just two signs of a different attitude
towards war or peace with Israel.

[00:23:59.256]
So the Arab-Israeli conflict is a huge
factor and the more it remains unresolved,

[00:24:04.646]
the more problematic the region is.

[00:24:07.906]
The ninth point I would say is
a growing sense of injustice

[00:24:13.236]
and double standards felt by
many people in the region.

[00:24:16.666]
And the injustices and double
standards that more and more people

[00:24:19.876]
in our region feel are anchored both in
local exercise of power, how Arab governments

[00:24:26.626]
and governments in the region are
treating their own people in an unfair,

[00:24:31.026]
inequitable, and sometimes brutal way.

[00:24:35.516]
And also at injustices that we feel are
coming from abroad, the double standards

[00:24:40.206]
in the application of U.N. resolutions, access
to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

[00:24:45.606]
and the use of force for political change.

[00:24:49.086]
Many complaints are made in our region routinely
about the West but also about the Arabs

[00:24:54.496]
and the Israelis, so this
is a very common complaint.

[00:24:58.376]
And number 10 point, I believe that is an
important indicator of how we got here is

[00:25:04.326]
that the rule of law, the
application of the rule

[00:25:06.736]
of law has been very erratic
throughout the Arab world.

[00:25:08.876]
There is rule of law but it's applied
in an erratic and inconsistent way

[00:25:15.166]
and has created a greater sense of
indignity among ordinary Arabs who feel

[00:25:21.866]
that what their governments are
doing or what the power structures

[00:25:26.136]
in the societies are doing
is not fair to everybody.

[00:25:29.086]
That most people don't have a fair chance
to really advance in life and benefit

[00:25:35.956]
from their education and their hard work,
that the, the, the situation is skewed

[00:25:41.166]
to help the small group of people
who hold power while the majority

[00:25:45.146]
of other people are disadvantaged.

[00:25:47.496]
And this erratic application of the rule of law

[00:25:50.826]
and equitable power distribution is a major
point that has driven protest movements

[00:25:57.296]
and activism around the Arab world, particularly
Islamist movements who have become very strong

[00:26:04.836]
and are critical of their own governments as
they are critical of Israel and Western powers.

[00:26:11.016]
But the main driving force of
most of the Islamist movements

[00:26:14.836]
in the modern period has been domestic
imbalances, social inequity, abuse of power,

[00:26:23.366]
corruption, unfair application of
state assets, etcetera, etcetera.

[00:26:29.766]
So those 10 points I think are
the main ones as many, many others

[00:26:33.716]
but I think they help explain why is
it that this region is so turbulent

[00:26:39.656]
and is so violent in many situations.

[00:26:43.286]
And why is it in many cases why the
governments and the power structures in many

[00:26:50.356]
of our countries have responded to these
stresses by becoming more autocratic and, and,

[00:26:57.256]
and dominating society to a greater
degree and not opening up and liberalizing

[00:27:03.806]
as many other countries that are in
the world after the end of the Cold War

[00:27:06.926]
but rather tightening their controls.

[00:27:09.056]
The consequences of these trends and
other ones are pretty clear to see.

[00:27:13.336]
There's a widespread fear and
vulnerability among, a sense of fear

[00:27:17.866]
and vulnerability among many people in the area.

[00:27:21.636]
They feel that they're increasingly vulnerable.

[00:27:24.536]
The economic stress, foreign armies, their
own systems, their own security systems,

[00:27:30.706]
criminal activity, environmental pressures,
all kinds of reasons why people should be more

[00:27:38.606]
and more concerned, particularly young
people worried about getting a job

[00:27:43.106]
and having an opportunity to live a decent life.

[00:27:46.336]
And second consequence is that this is
a region widely riddled with violence

[00:27:51.816]
as a normal means of political expression.

[00:27:54.636]
And the violence is practiced by three main
groups; the governments and political structures

[00:28:00.566]
of these region use violence against their own
people or against neighbors, opposition groups

[00:28:05.746]
and terror groups use violence, and foreign
armies and invading forces use violence.

[00:28:11.666]
And these three main groups have
now created this cycle of violence

[00:28:16.556]
which is a common vocabulary of political
conduct throughout the Middle East.

[00:28:21.986]
Third consequence is the fragmentation of
the central power and authority that used

[00:28:29.106]
to define the, most of the
countries in this region.

[00:28:31.976]
If you had come to the Middle East -- and this
applies to Turkey, Iran, the Arab countries --

[00:28:36.516]
if you have come there in 1950 or
1960 you essentially had to deal

[00:28:40.486]
with one central government which controlled
everything, the military, the police,

[00:28:45.606]
the economy, the media, the schools.

[00:28:48.446]
They controlled everything.

[00:28:49.986]
If you go to most Arab countries today, you
have to, there is no one central authority

[00:28:54.906]
that controls everything, even in government,

[00:28:56.876]
even in countries where the government is very
strong, like Jordan, like Turkey, like Morocco,

[00:29:03.216]
where you have a strong, tough,
credible, legitimate central government.

[00:29:08.316]
But even there they don't have
the control that they used to.

[00:29:12.106]
People get their media information
from other sources than the government.

[00:29:16.646]
They get a lot of their services
from the private sector and NGOs.

[00:29:20.196]
A lot of people turn to non-government
forces for even the representation

[00:29:24.986]
of their very identity, whether they turn
to Islamist groups or to tribal groups

[00:29:29.256]
or to ethnic leaderships or private corporate
groups, they, they don't necessarily turn

[00:29:34.556]
to the government as the main group that
represents them but there's other groups

[00:29:39.776]
that compete for, for this kind of authority.

[00:29:43.996]
You have therefore many new
actors emerging in society,

[00:29:50.406]
non-state actors is how they
were traditionally called.

[00:29:54.156]
But I would say that they were
actually parallel-state actors.

[00:29:56.866]
You have now groups like the Muslim brothers,
like Hezbollah, like Hamas in Palestine,

[00:30:02.096]
some of the big tribal federations
and tribal organizations,

[00:30:06.406]
some of the private sector corporations,
even some big NGOs in some countries.

[00:30:12.046]
You have a whole range of groups that now are
active in society openly, publicly, legally.

[00:30:18.406]
And they operate at a level in which they do
similar services to what the governments used

[00:30:23.446]
to do, including providing security,
providing political representation,

[00:30:28.186]
negotiating with foreign powers, and
therefore you have a whole bunch of new actors

[00:30:34.556]
who are not just non-state actors,
they're parallel-state actors.

[00:30:37.406]
We have a very strange phenomenon
in the Arab world

[00:30:40.256]
where we have multiple authorities
and single sovereignties.

[00:30:43.506]
So in Lebanon for instance you have
Hezbollah and you have the government.

[00:30:46.596]
In Palestine you have Hamas, you have Fatah.

[00:30:49.356]
In Somalia, you have a whole
range of different people.

[00:30:53.506]
In Iraq, you have got all
kinds of groups now emerging.

[00:30:56.336]
So you have these multiple centers
of power and authority and legitimacy

[00:31:01.446]
and service delivery who coexist very easily.

[00:31:04.156]
They're not fighting each other to take over.

[00:31:06.656]
They're not necessarily -- it's not a zero sum
game where only one group is going to emerge.

[00:31:11.256]
That's how it used to be back in the 50's
and 60's but now there's more sophistication,

[00:31:16.756]
maybe just more weariness, whatever.

[00:31:18.446]
But people now are much more nuanced about
coexisting with different power structures

[00:31:23.896]
and power authorities working
alongside each other.

[00:31:27.426]
And they sometimes share power
as in the government in Lebanon.

[00:31:31.136]
You have Hezbollah, you have
the Hariri led March 14 groups,

[00:31:35.066]
and they're part of the same government,
half of which is aligned with Iran,

[00:31:39.416]
half of which is aligned with the United States.

[00:31:41.226]
So the Lebanese government is the
first Iranian-American joint venture

[00:31:45.066]
and political governance in the Arab world.

[00:31:47.106]
But it exists and it works and
people find it very natural.

[00:31:51.566]
Similarly, in Palestine at one
point, Hamas and Fatah were

[00:31:55.046]
in a unity government and they split up.

[00:31:56.876]
They'll come back at some point one day and
you find this going on in Yemen and Somalia,

[00:32:01.986]
in Egypt and every, all over the place.

[00:32:03.996]
You find this process of different
legitimate groups competing with each other

[00:32:09.696]
but then coming together when
they, when they, when they need to.

[00:32:15.016]
Another trend or consequence of this is that you
have now many different conflicts in the region,

[00:32:19.926]
a region that used to be dominated and
defined by the Arab-Israeli conflict

[00:32:23.606]
and the Cold War and that was about it.

[00:32:25.946]
Those were the two major conflicts.

[00:32:28.516]
[00:32:30.516]
The Middle East now is defined by a wide
range of conflicts internally within countries

[00:32:37.766]
like Yemen, like Somalia,
like Lebanon, like Palestine.

[00:32:41.656]
Then you have problems in Iraq, obviously.

[00:32:45.096]
Then you have conflicts between countries -- the
Arab-Israeli conflict, tensions between Syria

[00:32:50.466]
and Lebanon which now have eased but they
come and go, tensions between Arab countries

[00:32:56.046]
and Iran, and many of these internal
conflicts as in Lebanon and Yemen and Palestine

[00:33:03.106]
and Iraq are proxy battles for
bigger conflicts between Iran

[00:33:06.996]
and the United States and other groups.

[00:33:08.586]
So you have a whole range of conflicts
now that, that take place in the region

[00:33:13.076]
and they've all come together
in a kind of regional Cold War.

[00:33:16.366]
So it's impossible now for somebody to go in
as they used to try to do before to say, "Okay,

[00:33:21.756]
we're going to try to solve
the Arab-Israeli conflict."

[00:33:24.406]
You can't solve the Arab-Israeli conflict
unless you address Syria, Lebanon,

[00:33:29.116]
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

[00:33:33.386]
There's many different tensions and conflicts
that have to be addressed now collectively

[00:33:38.426]
and this is part of the complexity
of this region which comes

[00:33:42.316]
about because we've had this process going
on for decades and decades and decades.

[00:33:47.256]
And again the Arab-Israeli conflict is the
single most destabilizing and problematic reason

[00:33:53.976]
for the degradation of the
stability and security of the area.

[00:33:58.736]
There's other reasons, it's not
the only one, but it's the oldest

[00:34:01.426]
and the most serious reason why
you have all of these problems.

[00:34:04.796]
Imagine if the Arab-Israeli
conflict had been solved in 1975.

[00:34:09.356]
Hamas and Hezbollah probably wouldn't exist.

[00:34:11.916]
They came into existence in the early 80's,
mainly as a response to Israeli occupation.

[00:34:16.736]
The Iranian-Israeli tension
probably wouldn't be there.

[00:34:20.916]
So there's many reasons why you have
a clear link between the continuation

[00:34:28.546]
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the security
problems and pressures that you can see

[00:34:33.736]
in many other parts of the region.

[00:34:36.886]
Another important thing that, trend that
we can see is as a, as a response to many

[00:34:45.066]
of these developments, there is a new sense
of kind of what I could call defiance.

[00:34:50.386]
Some people talk of resistance
but you have hundreds of millions

[00:34:57.176]
of people in the Arab world and Iran.

[00:35:00.356]
You have something like 500 million people.

[00:35:03.646]
Out of those 500 million people,
the vast majority in the last 25

[00:35:08.446]
or 30 years have asserted in public their
political and personal views and worked actively

[00:35:15.916]
to try to change conditions
that they complain about.

[00:35:19.366]
Whether it's their own domestic
political hypocrisy, foreign intervention,

[00:35:23.246]
Arab-Israeli wars, occupations, economic
disparities, whatever is the reason

[00:35:29.126]
of their complaint, what you have and I would
say this is the single most important political

[00:35:35.036]
development in our region in the last
two generations is the end of docility.

[00:35:39.876]
That huge numbers of people and I would say
we're talking here of 2 to 400 million people,

[00:35:45.436]
are no longer willing to acquiesce in
the conditions that they have inherited

[00:35:52.036]
of occupation, of foreign subjugation, of
domestic inequity, political abuse, corruption,

[00:35:59.066]
lack of democracy, fixed
elections, the kinds of things

[00:36:03.616]
that they've suffered internally
and regionally and globally.

[00:36:07.006]
And they're trying to do
something about it and they --

[00:36:09.936]
and this is why you have all of these actors.

[00:36:12.746]
Islamist movements, democracy movements,
human rights movements, civil society groups,

[00:36:17.796]
student groups, women's groups,
professionals, lawyer's associations,

[00:36:22.026]
there's all kinds of mechanisms that
people have used including violent actions

[00:36:27.266]
by small militants and terrorist
groups, militia groups.

[00:36:31.426]
There's all kinds of different
groups during different things

[00:36:35.156]
but the single common denominator I
believe that's important for us is

[00:36:38.856]
that there is no longer a docile, acquiescent
population in the Arab-Islamic region

[00:36:46.406]
of the Middle East that is willing to, to
be docile in the face of its own subjugation

[00:36:54.696]
or occupation or marginalization
or pauperization.

[00:36:58.226]
And this is what we're seeing I think in all
of these groups that are much more active

[00:37:04.506]
and much more dynamic in society.

[00:37:08.006]
Another impact of all of
these things has been the role

[00:37:14.256]
of the United States is particularly
important I think.

[00:37:17.436]
The United States is the biggest
international power and it is actively involved

[00:37:22.376]
in the Middle East with its
army, with its diplomacy,

[00:37:24.546]
with its economic aid in many different ways.

[00:37:27.626]
But the striking thing about the U.S.
in the Middle East I believe is the fact

[00:37:34.846]
that the vast majority of people in that region
and I'm talking here of Arabs, Israelis, Turks,

[00:37:41.836]
and Iranians, the vast majority neither
respect nor fear the United States anymore.

[00:37:47.466]
This is a strong statement, I know,
but I think it is probably correct.

[00:37:54.436]
And if you look at how the United
States has behaved in the last, say,

[00:37:59.466]
15 years, this is a recent phenomenon.

[00:38:01.546]
If you look at how the United States has
behaved with the Arabs, with the Israelis,

[00:38:04.896]
with the Turks, with the Iranians, threatening
them, cajoling them, trying to buy them off.

[00:38:09.896]
I know the recent, the most recent, yesterday
the U.S. said its given up its attempt

[00:38:14.916]
to get the Israelis to free settlements which
they tried to do by pressure and they tried

[00:38:19.706]
to do by buying them off and
in neither case were they able

[00:38:22.356]
to do it and the U.S. just backed away.

[00:38:24.466]
They tried to pressure the Turks in different
things but the Turks stood up to them,

[00:38:28.226]
wouldn't let the Americans
go into Iraq through Turkey.

[00:38:30.806]
They've had sanctions and all kinds
of threats against Iran and Syria

[00:38:34.586]
which has just emboldened Iran and Syria
and they've used all kinds of pressures and,

[00:38:40.936]
and policies to get the Arabs to be compliant.

[00:38:44.456]
And while many Arab governments
have been compliant with the U.S.,

[00:38:47.356]
a lot of people in the Arab world
have become much more defiant.

[00:38:50.296]
And this is a very, very significant
situation which I think needs

[00:38:54.046]
to be studied much more carefully.

[00:38:55.526]
I believe it is, it is fair to
say that a majority of people

[00:38:59.516]
in our region neither respect
nor fear the United States.

[00:39:03.536]
And this is a shock I think if you're an
American citizen or the American government.

[00:39:09.226]
If people neither fear you nor respect
you, then you have virtually no influence

[00:39:14.166]
and I think this is the situation the
United States has found itself in.

[00:39:17.836]
It's waged two wars and is quickly
trying to get out of both of them.

[00:39:21.886]
It's trying to use its diplomatic efforts and
in no case has it had any significant success

[00:39:26.996]
with the Israelis, with the
Arabs, with the Iranians.

[00:39:29.816]
It's a very serious problem for the
United States and I think it is part

[00:39:33.406]
of the bigger picture that I'm trying
to draw which is in the old days,

[00:39:38.516]
when all they had to do was deal
with a bunch of Arab leaders,

[00:39:41.476]
then the Arab countries did
everything you wanted them to do.

[00:39:44.356]
Or a non-democratic Iran or a non-democratic
Turkey, it was very easy for you to just deal

[00:39:49.816]
with these leaders and you, and everything was
hunky dory, especially during the Cold War.

[00:39:54.166]
The situation has changed radically,
that large numbers of people in all

[00:39:58.506]
of these societies including in Israel
which is a very strong American ally,

[00:40:02.596]
the Israelis will not be dictated to by the
United States and they'll stand up to it

[00:40:07.106]
and we just saw a very good example of it.

[00:40:11.336]
And part of the reason for this I believe, I
mentioned many different factors, environmental,

[00:40:17.026]
political discontent, lack of democracy,
foreign armies, occupations, etcetera,

[00:40:21.606]
but I think that if there's a single
reason within the region I would say

[00:40:27.616]
that it is the pauperization of the
region and the demographic transition.

[00:40:33.536]
We're dealing with a region that is
I said about 65% under the age of 30.

[00:40:40.436]
This is a very young region and it's highly
urbanized and like I said basic needs are met.

[00:40:48.286]
People can walk to school and the health center.

[00:40:50.606]
They're not starving.

[00:40:52.036]
Nobody is dying of lack of vaccination.

[00:40:56.026]
But they feel that their, their biological
survival is not matched by a response

[00:41:05.736]
to their basic need for human dignity and
more importantly their sense of citizenship.

[00:41:10.486]
What does it mean to be a citizen of a country?

[00:41:12.826]
That you can vote in a non-rigged election,
that you can make your voice heard,

[00:41:16.996]
that you can hold your government accountable,

[00:41:19.466]
that there can be a normal process
of give and take in society.

[00:41:22.656]
People have not felt that their
citizenship rights have been exercised

[00:41:27.906]
and they're responding to that but most

[00:41:29.996]
of all I believe the single most
important factor is the economic stress.

[00:41:33.876]
And in the last 25, 30 years this
has been one of the most important

[00:41:39.736]
but understudied factors I believe in
the entire transformation of this region.

[00:41:46.706]
And I want to give you just two statistics.

[00:41:50.286]
One is for the entire, for the entire Arab world
-- this is World Bank data from last year --

[00:42:00.896]
if you take the 22 Arab countries and
you look at the gross domestic product

[00:42:05.336]
and constant prices, and constant
prices, not those adjusted for inflation.

[00:42:09.836]
In the decade of the 1980's, the per capita
GDP which is a rough measure of average wealth,

[00:42:20.816]
the per capita GDP in the 1980's
averaged over that decade was $2671.

[00:42:28.546]
In this decade from 2000 to 2009, that figure
of $2671 after 20 years has dropped to $2557.

[00:42:39.436]
This is adjusted per capita real
income, real GDP per capita.

[00:42:44.036]
And this is a shocking situation and
this is for the entire Arab world.

[00:42:49.996]
If you take away the oil states,
the wealthy, and you take away--

[00:42:52.806]
and you leave just the poorer countries --
Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, etcetera, Yemen --

[00:42:58.916]
you are dealing with a region that has been poor
for ma- a long time and continues to get poorer

[00:43:06.306]
and this is one of the greatest problems.

[00:43:08.586]
Let me give you one more, more dramatic example.

[00:43:10.856]
If you take the country of Jordan, just one
country, and you take that critical decade

[00:43:17.416]
from the 19 mid-80's to the mid-90's which
I believe is the critical decade which co-

[00:43:24.416]
coincides with the economic stress on the Arab
world in the mid-80's, the end of the Cold War,

[00:43:29.356]
and then the transitional years after that.

[00:43:32.336]
From 1985 to 1995, in one country,
Jordan, which is a pretty normal country,

[00:43:37.866]
it's not an oil state; it's not a
completely desolate, poor state.

[00:43:43.246]
It's a pretty normal place and those of you
who know Jordan know that it's a nice place

[00:43:47.486]
and it's pleasant and, and the people
are dynamic and they're friendly.

[00:43:52.556]
But between 1985 and 1995, if you take the
gross domestic product per capita in Jordan

[00:43:59.736]
and you just take those dinar figures which the
government gives you and then you translate them

[00:44:05.376]
into constant prices in U.S. dollars -- and
the reason you have to do it in U.S. dollars is

[00:44:10.496]
because most of what Jordan consumes,
like most of the Arab world, is imported.

[00:44:15.366]
Airplanes, fuel, furniture, computers,
food, most of it is imported,

[00:44:20.756]
so you have to denominate in dollars
to see what is the actual real income

[00:44:26.136]
or purchasing power of an average citizen.

[00:44:29.136]
In that period between '85 and
'95 in Jordan, the GDP per capita

[00:44:33.446]
in constant U.S. dollars
declined from $2244 to $908.

[00:44:40.456]
It's an unbelievable drop.

[00:44:42.086]
You don't hear these figures very much
because people in the Middle East tend not

[00:44:47.786]
to like to talk about this reality.

[00:44:50.786]
But this is the reality that we're dealing
with, whether it's at the micro level

[00:44:53.706]
of the entire region or if it -- and if
you take this same exercise and do it

[00:44:57.706]
for any other country in the region you're
going to get a similar range of views.

[00:45:03.296]
And therefore you have a situation
today where across the region --

[00:45:10.506]
and here I'm talking about
only the Arab world, though,

[00:45:13.236]
leaving out Israel, Iran,
and Turkey for a moment.

[00:45:15.556]
And across the Arab world, you have a huge,
young population that is suffering this kind

[00:45:22.396]
of economic stress with the environmental
stress, with the domestic political constraints,

[00:45:27.756]
with the regional tensions and
frustrations of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

[00:45:31.616]
with the international pressures of foreign
armies and, and the perception that the U.N.

[00:45:37.686]
and the world, the West, are
applying double standards.

[00:45:40.646]
When you put all of these things together,
you end up with a population of mostly young,

[00:45:48.156]
very frustrated and worried people.

[00:45:52.056]
But more than just being frustrated and
worried, we're dealing with a young population

[00:45:56.996]
that in more and more cases
is gradually detaching itself

[00:46:01.906]
from the anchorage of its own society.

[00:46:04.716]
And I think if you look at the most interesting
data that I think we have today is a poll

[00:46:11.356]
that was just done by the Gallup organization,

[00:46:14.056]
a poll of youth in every single
Arab country, aged 15 to 29.

[00:46:19.016]
And the polling done by Gallup for a
group in Qatar called Silatech which deals

[00:46:26.076]
with transitions of young people from education
to employment, the Arab youth's polling

[00:46:32.366]
that has been done has given us some
really important indications of the reality

[00:46:36.906]
of young people who are the majority of people.

[00:46:39.976]
But I think the youth's perceptions reflect
the wider perceptions of all Arab society,

[00:46:45.066]
showing the reality which is that you have
serious pressures, concerns, vulnerabilities,

[00:46:51.766]
fears, worries, serious ones, combined
with powerful forces for self-confidence,

[00:46:59.396]
hope for the future, a sense of security.

[00:47:02.646]
And this is the reality of the Arab
world which is so important to grasp.

[00:47:07.966]
Why at the same time do you have evidence of
violence, extremism, dysfunctional behavior,

[00:47:16.566]
etcetera, etcetera, combined with
this strong sense of stability?

[00:47:22.716]
But let me just give you a few statistics from
-- remember this is talking about young people

[00:47:28.886]
in the entire Arab countries, 22 countries with
nationally representative samples by Gallup.

[00:47:37.096]
90% of young people feel that they
actually are free to express themselves.

[00:47:42.166]
This is really important.

[00:47:43.866]
They feel they have the freedom to speak, partly
because of the new information technology --

[00:47:49.016]
internet, and cell phones and stuff.

[00:47:50.816]
They can express themselves which people in my
generation and before couldn't do so easily.

[00:47:56.856]
They feel they are -- 65% roughly -- are
satisfied with the freedoms in their life

[00:48:04.786]
to do whatever they want which is quite
significant, about two-thirds of them almost.

[00:48:11.196]
There are positive elements like 86 percent,
the overwhelming majority, feel that if they are

[00:48:20.436]
in a moment of need, that they have people in
their immediate environment, family, friends,

[00:48:26.566]
cousins, neighbors, NGOs,
charitable societies --

[00:48:30.456]
they have people who will help them immediately.

[00:48:32.846]
That they feel, 86% feel that they have somebody

[00:48:35.736]
who can immediately help
them if they need something.

[00:48:39.336]
Along -- then you have something
like 88% to 90% feel that religion

[00:48:46.626]
and family are important forces in their
society or they can rely on those forces.

[00:48:52.446]
So you have some strong indicators of a large
number of young Arabs who are not desperate,

[00:49:01.516]
who feel that they have protection.

[00:49:04.146]
They have anchorage in society
that they can turn to.

[00:49:08.696]
It's not the government.

[00:49:11.206]
It's mostly family, friends, religion,
neighbors, etcetera, but though to be fair also

[00:49:17.176]
about 70% or so say that they are content.

[00:49:24.286]
They feel that their environment that
they live in in their town or village

[00:49:28.026]
or city, they're satisfied with it.

[00:49:31.666]
It's not, you know, five-star luxury,
but they're, they're satisfied.

[00:49:35.426]
They think that their living
in decent conditions.

[00:49:38.576]
Yet, the negative aspects are equally striking.

[00:49:46.366]
30, 30% only feel that they can
find good, affordable housing.

[00:49:53.476]
They are worried about, they don't have
-- they can't find affordable housing.

[00:49:56.286]
They can't get married.

[00:49:57.836]
They're particularly worried
about housing as an impediment

[00:50:01.666]
to leaving youth, childhood,
and becoming adults.

[00:50:06.986]
30% on average across the region want to
immigrate permanently, to go to another country.

[00:50:14.476]
And this 30% is for the regional average.

[00:50:17.076]
It goes up to 45% in some
cases like Algeria and others.

[00:50:21.506]
It goes up to 45% or more but 30
is the entire regional average.

[00:50:25.716]
If one-third of your young people who are
educated, who are the most productive element

[00:50:30.616]
in your society, one-third of these
people want to leave, that's a bad sign.

[00:50:34.656]
And they would leave if they
could but most of them can't.

[00:50:37.246]
Nobody will take them.

[00:50:38.716]
They won't get -- they can't get visas.

[00:50:41.596]
You have a problem with confidence in
the integrity of the central government.

[00:50:49.816]
About 50 percent, 51% say that
they have -- well, excuse me --

[00:50:56.826]
51 and 53 because you have
males and females are different.

[00:51:00.666]
But they -- about 51 or 53% feel they
have confidence in the central government.

[00:51:05.276]
In other words, almost half of the young people
have no confidence in their central government.

[00:51:10.206]
Same thing for the judiciary, about 53% have
confidence in the judiciary but 47% don't.

[00:51:17.876]
Only 45% have confidence in the media.

[00:51:23.766]
The young people have completely
turned away from their mass media.

[00:51:26.486]
They don't follow it.

[00:51:27.306]
They don't -- they, they,
they create their own media.

[00:51:29.916]
This is one of the results of the youth
study that we have just completed.

[00:51:34.796]
Only 40% of young people
in the Arab world believe

[00:51:40.416]
that elections held in their country are honest.

[00:51:43.316]
60% feel that elections are a sham.

[00:51:48.136]
These are very strong, clear, accurate,
dispassionate indicators of societies in stress.

[00:51:56.466]
And I've mentioned the main reasons that I
think help us to understand how we got here.

[00:52:03.296]
I think -- what, what, what, what we can see
now is that there are many actors in societies,

[00:52:11.726]
in our societies who are behaving in a way
that represents their desire to change things,

[00:52:20.406]
to address some of these problems and pressures.

[00:52:23.066]
And again, there's a multitude
of different actors.

[00:52:25.916]
Each one is motivated by something else,
religious groups, tribal sector, political,

[00:52:31.636]
militant, and all kinds of groups but the
reality is that they're all working at once

[00:52:37.056]
and what you have for the first time is a
dynamic situation of change and transformation

[00:52:43.196]
in which these groups as I said
coalesce into three broad categories;

[00:52:47.166]
the monarchy, the mosque, and the market.

[00:52:50.286]
And they give us a bit of a balancing act
now which creates a little bit of stability.

[00:52:55.556]
Now we have a stable system -- it,
it's a dynamic but stable system

[00:53:00.126]
but this is a transitional moment, this
situation isn't going to last for a long time.

[00:53:06.646]
And people are talking about
the four R's that I mentioned.

[00:53:09.966]
People are demanding their
rights, they're demanding respect,

[00:53:14.426]
and the respect they are demanding is from their
own authorities as well as from foreigners.

[00:53:19.996]
Whether it's Hamas demanding respect
from Israel or Syria demanding respect

[00:53:25.596]
from the United States or somebody demanding
respect from somebody else, the respect is, the,

[00:53:31.166]
the, the respect is probably the single greatest
common denominator among all of these actors.

[00:53:39.586]
It's an intangible element of being, of
being treated fairly, being treated decently,

[00:53:46.646]
of being allowed to behave as
a human being and as a citizen.

[00:53:50.386]
Not to be treated like an animal or
a second-class person and this demand

[00:53:55.936]
for respect is oriented to people's
own governments and societies

[00:54:01.406]
as well as foreign, foreign ones.

[00:54:02.946]
So respect is, is incredibly important.

[00:54:06.826]
Resistance is what many people say they
are doing in the Arab world and Iran.

[00:54:12.566]
Resisting forces that they believe threaten
them whether it's Israeli forces occupying them

[00:54:19.376]
or Americans or British army
or Arab conservative forces

[00:54:22.666]
or private sector dominating
corporations, whatever.

[00:54:26.216]
They have many accusations against many people.

[00:54:28.666]
But resistance is the term that people use
now and, and, and the Syrians and the Iranians

[00:54:34.456]
and others are grouping themselves with a range
of different organizations in our societies

[00:54:41.616]
and they call themselves the
Resistance and Deterrents Front.

[00:54:44.926]
You, you may think this is crazy.

[00:54:46.796]
You may like it.

[00:54:47.586]
You may not like it.

[00:54:48.416]
I have my own views.

[00:54:49.826]
I'm not saying this is great or bad,
I'm just saying this is how things are

[00:54:54.736]
and this is how they see themselves and
they feel that they're actually doing well,

[00:55:00.626]
that their points are, they're making --
scoring points and holding their ground

[00:55:06.676]
and forcing others to deal with them.

[00:55:09.496]
And finally righteousness and righteousness
is something that both the American army,

[00:55:15.256]
the Israeli army, and Arab
resistance forces claim.

[00:55:19.486]
Righteousness is the common language of people
who are active in trying to achieve their rights

[00:55:26.436]
as citizens and claiming divine support.

[00:55:31.076]
It's interesting that Israelis
and Americans and Arabs and Turks

[00:55:34.136]
and Iranians all speak in the same language.

[00:55:38.096]
So I'll finish by just saying that when we --

[00:55:41.226]
this is a very quick, superficial
overview trying to give you the complexity

[00:55:47.046]
of these issues but in the final
analysis what are we talking about?

[00:55:50.486]
What are the issues?

[00:55:51.436]
What are the problems?

[00:55:52.256]
What does this tell us about Arab society
and Middle Eastern society as a whole?

[00:55:56.456]
It tells us that there's a range of
issues that are now being contested.

[00:56:00.626]
That the people of the region have put on
the table, have put on the public agenda,

[00:56:06.886]
and the issues are big sticker items.

[00:56:10.486]
Statehood is a contested issue.

[00:56:12.976]
The states of this region are not stable in many
cases and are changing and people are looking

[00:56:19.236]
at statehood and trying to fix it up.

[00:56:22.176]
Sovereignty is an issue that many
people are contesting, challenging.

[00:56:28.376]
And many people feel that they're
independent but they're not sovereign,

[00:56:31.636]
that somebody else really tells them what to do.

[00:56:34.506]
Nationhood is an issue that is up for grabs.

[00:56:38.936]
People talk of the Islamic
nation, of the Arab nation.

[00:56:42.656]
They talk of their own countries.

[00:56:44.036]
They talk of tribal allegiances.

[00:56:45.936]
The idea of belonging to a bigger
nation is very much discussed.

[00:56:52.006]
The exercise of power and the legitimacy of
governance and the two things go together.

[00:56:57.826]
Power and governance and legitimacy
are central themes of what is going on.

[00:57:04.026]
The issue of identity -- people are expressing
their multiple identities; religious, tribal,

[00:57:11.216]
professional, political,
ideological, social, cultural.

[00:57:14.736]
All kinds of identities are
now actively on the table.

[00:57:19.136]
Citizenship rights -- what does it
mean to be a citizen of a country?

[00:57:23.546]
What are the limits to the power of the
government to intervene in your life?

[00:57:27.846]
Human development issues
-- access to basic needs.

[00:57:31.156]
As I said most basic needs are
pro- are reasonably well met

[00:57:35.576]
but now there's a growing concern
particularly in environmental terms

[00:57:39.266]
and in quality of education and jobs.

[00:57:41.826]
Security and stability are important issues.

[00:57:46.166]
A lot of societies are stable
but they're not secure.

[00:57:49.746]
There's bombings, there's foreign
invasions, there's occupations,

[00:57:52.296]
there's criminal activity, there's terrorism.

[00:57:54.356]
There are all kinds of threats to security.

[00:57:56.826]
And finally, relations with
the rest of the world.

[00:58:00.206]
We don't really know, we don't really know if a
majority of Arabs wants to make war with Israel

[00:58:07.086]
or wants to make peace with Israel.

[00:58:09.366]
And we don't really know if
a majority of Israelis wants

[00:58:12.546]
to make war or peace with the Palestinians.

[00:58:14.966]
We really don't know that.

[00:58:16.606]
We have certain ideas but these are not clear.

[00:58:19.626]
The relationships of the people of this region
with foreign actors is very much imprecise,

[00:58:27.716]
very vague and needs to be clarified.

[00:58:30.306]
We don't know if the majority of people

[00:58:32.546]
in the Arab world think the United States is
their friend or they United States is a threat.

[00:58:37.456]
We know that both views are there and we don't
know really how many Arabs think Iran is right

[00:58:44.246]
in doing what it's doing and
how many Arabs fear Iran.

[00:58:47.656]
There's different views.

[00:58:49.016]
And there's views of governments and there's
views of ordinary people and there's views

[00:58:52.546]
of political groups in the
Arab world as a range.

[00:58:55.616]
All of these issues are now issues
that are being publicly discussed.

[00:59:03.436]
We have this very important historic
transition taking place in the Arab world

[00:59:08.026]
which is woefully underreported and not
well understood I think internationally

[00:59:12.546]
because people don't take the time to look
into our society and to understand, well,

[00:59:16.796]
what's going on at the community level.

[00:59:19.396]
What's going on in the minds
and hearts of ordinary people?

[00:59:22.596]
Why are people violent?

[00:59:23.826]
Why are they extremists?

[00:59:24.906]
Why are they emotional?

[00:59:25.886]
Why do they do what they do?

[00:59:27.876]
And I think it's important for institutions like
yours and ours and academics and journalists

[00:59:33.826]
to make a greater effort to understand
that we have in the Arab world

[00:59:39.386]
and the Middle East a resumption of
history and possibly a birth of politics.

[00:59:44.346]
And this should be a meeting point for
those of us like myself, certainly,

[00:59:49.276]
and I hope many of you who believe

[00:59:51.266]
that there shouldn't be hostility
between Arabs and Americans.

[00:59:54.526]
That the basic fundamental
values or American society

[00:59:58.886]
and of Arab-Islamic society
are identical values.

[01:00:02.436]
They focus on justice and equality and
consent of the government, a majority of will

[01:00:08.986]
and protecting minority rights, these
sort of themes that are very common

[01:00:11.766]
in the Islamist religious political
discourse in our region and very common

[01:00:17.356]
in the American public discourse.

[01:00:19.556]
So this should be a much greater meeting
ground between people in the Arab world

[01:00:23.476]
and the wider Islamic Middle East and Israel
and the United States and I think we have

[01:00:27.706]
to make an effort to try to achieve that.

[01:00:30.986]
But the first step to doing that is

[01:00:32.846]
to understand more accurately what is
actually happening on the ground and I hope

[01:00:37.566]
that I've given you some insights
into some of these issues.

[01:00:40.816]
Thank you very much for being here.

[01:00:42.516]
( Applause )

[01:00:48.996]
>> Norman Bishara: Great.

[01:00:49.556]
We have a, we have about 15,
20 minutes for the questions.

[01:00:52.096]
If you are able, please come to the mic to be
recorded onto the (inaudible) Questions, yes.

[01:01:02.516]
( Silence )

[01:01:08.546]
>> The picture you give concerning youth is the
volatility, the volatility of the situation...

[01:01:16.366]
>> Rhami Khouri: Hold the mic up, yeah.

[01:01:16.906]
>> Okay. The volatility of the situation is best
expressed in what the statistics you've given

[01:01:23.496]
about the youth and it definitely is very much
anchored in the pauperization of the society

[01:01:30.616]
as a whole which the youth particularly.

[01:01:33.426]
This does not fully apply to the Gulf region
where the youth are undergoing also, I mean,

[01:01:41.716]
from material that I work and I know of --
the youth itself is undergoing quite a lot

[01:01:50.236]
of the issue of the need to voice.

[01:01:54.586]
>> Rhami Khouri: Of what?

[01:01:55.356]
>> To voice, to have a say and
this is the beginning of that.

[01:02:00.816]
Do you sense that sort of
differentiation in the Arab world?

[01:02:04.496]
I mean, the Gulf region is not exactly
the same story that you have given

[01:02:09.786]
in the other parts of the Arab world.

[01:02:11.726]
>> Rhami Khouri: That, that's right.

[01:02:12.376]
And I didn't have enough time
but the statistics are if you go

[01:02:15.836]
to the Gallup report for Silatech, it's online.

[01:02:18.276]
It's very, very important data and
is differentiated into high income,

[01:02:23.346]
middle income, low income countries.

[01:02:25.306]
So for instance the desire to immigrate I
said is 30% across the board on average.

[01:02:30.206]
In the Gulf countries it's only about
5 or 6% because they're wealthy,

[01:02:34.166]
they feel that their needs are
met, there's no need to immigrate.

[01:02:36.756]
They can get jobs automatically.

[01:02:38.726]
And the non-oil countries, the poorer countries,
it's 40% or higher so the average is 30.

[01:02:45.806]
So there clearly is a differentiation.

[01:02:47.716]
This is not a uniform region.

[01:02:49.906]
There are big difference with -- and the
differences are mainly based on income.

[01:02:55.776]
You fi- you find that gender, there
are some differences based on gender.

[01:03:00.426]
There are some differences based on
geographical location but it's income

[01:03:03.606]
that is the main defining factor that creates
differences in people's attitudes or behavior

[01:03:10.246]
and people in the Gulf, you know,
the Gulf region we have to be aware.

[01:03:17.076]
I mean, they've only really been developing

[01:03:18.816]
at a serious national level
for probably two generations.

[01:03:22.326]
I mean, it's only really since the 50's or
60's or even some of them even later than that

[01:03:27.756]
with the oil boom that they really
started developing on a national scale.

[01:03:31.656]
Others, the Saudis and Kuwaitis
from the 50's and --

[01:03:35.166]
but these are young countries and they've been
so absorbed in a rapid process of state building

[01:03:42.416]
and in many cases making a lot of money that
they haven't paid attention to other issues.

[01:03:47.036]
But I think we're now seeing among
people in the Gulf and other places signs

[01:03:51.546]
of a desire even among wealthy people that they
want to manifest all of their human dimensions.

[01:03:59.876]
To think, to speak, to read different opinions,
to have a view on things, to have a debate,

[01:04:05.196]
to have a discussion -- they shouldn't
be prevented from doing these things

[01:04:09.336]
so I think we're seeing signs of
that but it's strongest in the,

[01:04:12.926]
in the poorer countries, definitely.

[01:04:15.286]
[01:04:16.536]
>> Thanks for that very interesting talk, Rhami.

[01:04:21.266]
I also have a question about the Gulf states.

[01:04:23.596]
You had the model in which you described
the monarch, the market, and the mosque as,

[01:04:29.166]
as emerging in a, as an analog
to a checks and balances system

[01:04:34.156]
but in the Gulf I was thinking similar
to the person (inaudible) that my,

[01:04:38.856]
my perception is just who are they?

[01:04:40.366]
Do they function more like the three pillars
of, of, of the ruling coalition in a sense

[01:04:46.106]
that the mosque legitimated the monarch

[01:04:48.756]
and the monarchs relatives had
a commanding role in the market.

[01:04:51.756]
And so I was going to ask particularly
on the, with respect to the relationship

[01:04:56.456]
between the mosque and the monarch in the Gulf
states, whether you see a significant changes

[01:05:02.276]
over the past decade in the, you know, in the
opinions of sort of ordinary, ordinary Muslims

[01:05:10.236]
and the leaders of the clerical establishment.

[01:05:13.396]
And whether you see that
change as having locations

[01:05:17.116]
for the political during those countries.

[01:05:20.876]
>> Rhami Khouri: Okay.

[01:05:21.256]
Is this mic on?

[01:05:22.786]
Can you hear it if I just speak like this?

[01:05:24.656]
>> No.

[01:05:25.626]
>> Rhami Khouri: Is this for Homeland Security?

[01:05:26.866]
No, I'm just joking.

[01:05:27.606]
( Laughter )

[01:05:28.006]
That's a joke.

[01:05:28.976]
That was a joke if anybody from
Homeland Security was listening.

[01:05:35.106]
(Laughter) The, the Gulf is very
different, clearly, because of the wealth,

[01:05:40.666]
the young age of these countries,
the small size of them.

[01:05:45.556]
I made a calculation a few years
ago which was a little bit sort

[01:05:52.346]
of me- not mean but a little sensitive.

[01:05:54.566]
But I -- but I made a calculation.

[01:05:56.446]
This was back in the s- in the 70's that in
one small Gulf state which I will not mention

[01:06:01.816]
that you could put the entire population
of the indigenous natives on the fleet

[01:06:06.536]
of one major international airline.

[01:06:08.986]
And so you're not dealing
with large populations.

[01:06:11.646]
You're dealing with very small populations,
very young countries actively involved

[01:06:17.716]
in not just the state building
but creating an identity.

[01:06:21.556]
And you have great variations across
the regions, there's no doubt about it.

[01:06:27.136]
You take some Gulf countries like Kuwait
and if you look at the election results

[01:06:30.676]
or Bahrain you see the involvement
of the powerful role

[01:06:36.166]
of the monarchy, the political authority.

[01:06:39.646]
You see the religious groups
either aligned with the authority

[01:06:43.046]
or in some cases more conservative
than it and challenging it.

[01:06:46.666]
Or involved in some Islamist political parties
which you can see in places like Kuwait

[01:06:53.826]
or Bahrain where you have some public politics.

[01:06:57.496]
In other countries, you don't have public
politics and you don't have any kind

[01:07:02.606]
of public activism at a political level.

[01:07:05.496]
It just doesn't exist in countries
like Qatar, U.A.E., and Oman,

[01:07:09.566]
there is no political infrastructure.

[01:07:11.946]
But in Kuwait and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia
to some extent, you see signs of this

[01:07:18.916]
and it manifests itself through the
Islamic groups and manifests itself

[01:07:23.176]
through business groups, the private
sector and through the ruling elite.

[01:07:26.186]
So it varies a lot.

[01:07:27.966]
There isn't one model.

[01:07:28.986]
I just mentioned these three groups as the three
broad conglomerations of power and legitimacy

[01:07:34.566]
and authority that you can see
in every, in every country.

[01:07:40.516]
( Silence )

[01:07:47.066]
>> Hello. Thanks for that talk.

[01:07:48.416]
I'm wondering if you would have some idea
of how much money from the U.S., you know,

[01:07:59.446]
take all the money in all the
military that's been there

[01:08:03.306]
and how many Arabs has that money killed?

[01:08:07.956]
>> Rhami Khouri: How many what?

[01:08:08.826]
>> Arabs has that money killed?

[01:08:12.856]
>> Rhami Khouri: You could
probably (technical difficulty)

[01:08:15.516]
( Silence )

[01:08:20.496]
>> It's hard to trace it
back to any one country.

[01:08:25.276]
You really have to spread
the blame around, I think.

[01:08:28.956]
Clearly there's a problem with Arab governments
spending hundreds and hundreds of billions

[01:08:36.966]
of dollars on buying imported arms from the
U.S., and the U.S. the importer-exporter,

[01:08:42.576]
but Russia, the Europeans, everybody sells.

[01:08:45.666]
And in the end when they feel a little threat,
they feel threatened as recently we saw

[01:08:51.526]
on the Wiki leaks, some Arab leaders
worried about Iran, they go to the U.S.

[01:08:55.186]
and they say, "Please, do the job for us."

[01:08:56.856]
Or even they turn to the, they
say, if the Israelis are going

[01:08:59.606]
to do it, let them do it quickly.

[01:09:00.766]
So I think there's a question about, you
know, the armaments that have been bought

[01:09:07.286]
from the U.S. and others, how much use are they.

[01:09:11.676]
I think the question of how many people have
died and who is responsible for that really has

[01:09:17.316]
to be seen in the context of culpability
that has to be shared by many people.

[01:09:23.446]
I think the main ones would be the, the
Arab governments and the Israeli government

[01:09:30.176]
in terms of wars and active killings.

[01:09:32.516]
You have to really look within the region.

[01:09:35.666]
And the United States has a
role, the British have a role.

[01:09:38.596]
I mean, you can blame the British and the
French for a lot of historical hangovers.

[01:09:42.226]
The fact that we have all these tensions

[01:09:45.046]
and conflicts is partly due
to the historical legacy.

[01:09:48.086]
So there's a lot of blame
to go around but I think...

[01:09:52.126]
>> (Inaudible) say is within the last 10 years?

[01:09:53.906]
>> Rhami Khouri: Pardon?

[01:09:54.696]
>> Within the last 10 years.

[01:09:56.066]
>> Rhami Khouri: Well, in the last 10 years
if you're talking about the war in Iraq

[01:09:58.676]
and other things then you're
probably talking of a couple

[01:10:02.356]
of hundred thousand people
possibly but who knows?

[01:10:04.406]
I mean, this is contested.

[01:10:05.466]
But a lot, I mean, a lot
of people have been killed.

[01:10:08.206]
I think that we, we really, we need to do
these analyses very accurately and carefully.

[01:10:14.106]
It's really important to make sure that when,
if we do a calculation like that and say, "Okay,

[01:10:20.766]
we can blame the U.S. for
this amount of dead Arabs."

[01:10:24.216]
If that can be done, it really
needs to be done with great care.

[01:10:27.676]
I couldn't possibly give you a figure right now.

[01:10:30.576]
I mean, even the number of Iraqis
that have been killed is disputed.

[01:10:34.406]
The scholars who study these things
keep having a different formula for how

[01:10:39.446]
to calculate the number of people who have died
and of those who died, how many can be blamed

[01:10:43.856]
on Iraqi causes, other regional players?

[01:10:49.226]
And if you talk about the Arab-Israeli
conflict then where do you put the blame?

[01:10:52.806]
On the Arab leaders, on Israel, on
-- so it's very, very complicated.

[01:10:57.336]
And I, I think, you know, one of our
challenges is to understand the problems

[01:11:03.256]
that have brought us here,
to understand these forces.

[01:11:06.006]
And that's what I tried to do a little bit.

[01:11:07.236]
Say, "Well, here's a bunch
of reasons how we got here."

[01:11:10.146]
But I think we really have to focus on
how to we get out of this mess and we get

[01:11:15.036]
out of this mess I think by basically trying
to apply the rule of law evenly for everybody,

[01:11:20.926]
to have one standard of law and morality
and that applies to U.N. resolutions.

[01:11:26.776]
It applies to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

[01:11:29.916]
It applies to security guarantees.

[01:11:33.076]
It applies to national self-determination.

[01:11:35.406]
I mean, in all of these areas, Arabs,
Israelis, Iranians, Turks, Cypriots, Americans,

[01:11:42.576]
everybody needs to feel that they are
being treated according to a single,

[01:11:48.916]
common standard of law and
morality and that's not the case.

[01:11:52.346]
And that's why we have all of these tensions.

[01:11:56.756]
So I think it's really critical to understand
the issues of how we got here and the waste

[01:12:04.256]
of money and human deaths, etcetera.

[01:12:07.706]
But not to get stuck in that
and to try to figure

[01:12:11.206]
out well how do we prevent
that from happening again?

[01:12:13.586]
You know, you know, hundreds of
thousands of people have died

[01:12:16.586]
in the Middle East in the last two generations.

[01:12:19.636]
So how do we reduce that
death toll as we look ahead?

[01:12:22.516]
( Technical difficulty )

[01:12:27.966]
>> ...some questions regarding
Lebanon and the issues in Lebanon

[01:12:31.156]
that could potentially influence
the broader Middle East.

[01:12:35.026]
The first question is regarding the
Hariri assassination and the recent issues

[01:12:40.066]
with the tribunal that have gotten even
its neighbors talking including Israel.

[01:12:44.626]
How do you see the, the tribunal affecting
not only Lebanon but the broader Middle East,

[01:12:50.296]
specifically, what are your
predications on what, what,

[01:12:53.766]
what the tribunal will discover
and, and what are the effects of it?

[01:12:59.436]
And then my second question is regarding
Wiki leaks, a specific Wiki leak that came

[01:13:04.366]
out last night about Saudi Arabia wanting to
develop an Arab army to counter Hezbollah.

[01:13:11.016]
Do you see that as feasible, number one?

[01:13:14.846]
And number two, is that an, an inter-Arab
conflict, a conflict between Iran and the Arabs,

[01:13:21.376]
or a conflict between pro-Western and
anti-Western forces in the region?

[01:13:25.376]
>> Rhami Khouri: Which was that last one?

[01:13:26.516]
( Technical difficulty )

[01:13:31.046]
>> ...the Western forces in the region.

[01:13:32.126]
>> Rhami Khouri: The -- which
country are you talking about?

[01:13:34.496]
Lebanon or...

[01:13:35.326]
>> The, the, idea that Saudi Arabia
wants to develop an Arab army and to...

[01:13:39.876]
>> Rhami Khouri: To fight Hezbollah.

[01:13:41.206]
Okay, I just heard about that briefly.

[01:13:43.246]
I haven't actually read the story.

[01:13:46.066]
There's a lot of people in the Arab
world who are critical of Hezbollah.

[01:13:49.776]
Saudi Arabia hinted back in the 2006
war when Israel was fighting Hezbollah,

[01:13:55.116]
the Saudis made a hint that
Hezbollah shouldn't have done this,

[01:13:59.276]
that they were critical of Hezbollah.

[01:14:00.536]
And many people in the Arab world
openly criticize Hezbollah now.

[01:14:04.116]
You have to excuse my eating, I have a bit of
an allergy so I'm, I'm not being disrespectful

[01:14:10.726]
but I don't want to lose my voice.

[01:14:12.276]
Though maybe if somebody wanted
me to lose my voice but then...

[01:14:14.946]
(laughter) -- too late.

[01:14:15.526]
There's many people who are
critical of Hezbollah.

[01:14:20.296]
And, and this -- I said that you have this
alignment of groups in this kind of new Cold War

[01:14:24.856]
in the region with the Iranians,
Syrians, Hezbollah, Hamas,

[01:14:29.026]
nationalists, all kinds of groups on one side.

[01:14:31.856]
On the other side you have conservative
Arab groups, the U.S., Europeans,

[01:14:35.836]
sometimes with Israel, different alignments
of pro-Western forces in the Arab world

[01:14:41.066]
who are critical of the Islamists,
critical of Iran.

[01:14:44.066]
They, they are now fighting each other in many
different ways, sometimes actively militarily

[01:14:48.916]
when there's a military fight like
in Yemen or in Lebanon once or twice.

[01:14:53.136]
But they do it mostly ideologically
through the media, culturally,

[01:14:57.676]
and diplomatically and in other ways.

[01:14:59.986]
And, you know, if they -- I
don't know if there's truth --

[01:15:01.956]
the report about the Saudis is true.

[01:15:03.986]
It shouldn't be surprising.

[01:15:05.326]
The Saudis have expressed their
concerns about movements like Hezbollah.

[01:15:08.886]
The Saudis have clearly expressed their
concerns about what Iran is doing and we have,

[01:15:14.576]
thanks to the U.S. invasion of Iraq,

[01:15:16.786]
we have allowed what had been a
low-intensity Shiite-Sunni theological tension

[01:15:24.616]
and cultural tension to emerge into a full-blown
public exercise of ethnic cleansing and,

[01:15:30.136]
and, and barbarism on both sides.

[01:15:32.166]
People in Iraq particularly but you see
in other places killing each other just

[01:15:35.966]
because they are Sunnis and Shiites.

[01:15:37.316]
We never had this kind of level of
conflict in the Arab world before.

[01:15:42.516]
The tensions that were there between Sunnis and
Shiites were, were, were of a different nature.

[01:15:47.886]
And so this is just a reflection of
this bigger problem that we have --

[01:15:52.676]
the Iranian influence with
various Shiite Arab groups.

[01:15:57.356]
But it's not just Shiites because Iran
is close to Hamas and there's many Arabs

[01:16:01.316]
who are not Shiites who like what Iran is
doing so I think we've got to be very careful

[01:16:07.226]
about the, you know, Saudi
Hezbollah or Shiite-Sunni tension.

[01:16:11.796]
They are much broader than that.

[01:16:14.806]
I don't -- Hezbollah is a very strong
group but it is not invincible.

[01:16:19.686]
If, if, if people want to create armies to fight
it and if you get a coalition of Arabs and,

[01:16:25.046]
and Israelis and Americans and
Westerners who want to fight Hezbollah,

[01:16:28.806]
they can probably defeat it one day and
there is a small number of people --

[01:16:32.736]
but the damage would be so enormous that it
would set off a regional conflagration probably.

[01:16:38.626]
So I don't think there's a military solution to
the political reality that Hezbollah represents.

[01:16:44.576]
Hezbollah represents a political reality
which I alluded to briefly of this sense

[01:16:49.586]
of defiance and, and of resistance
that demands respect to achieve rights.

[01:16:58.486]
And I think that co- that linear process
of resistance and a sense of righteousness

[01:17:05.246]
to achieve, to, to get respect to achieve
your rights is what helps us understand a lot

[01:17:13.026]
of what's going on in the Middle East.

[01:17:15.406]
The answer I think, the better answer is to
ask, well, what is Hezbollah trying to do?

[01:17:21.486]
What does Hezbollah represent?

[01:17:23.036]
And other groups like it in the region?

[01:17:25.606]
What do the Iranians want?

[01:17:27.306]
Not to just say these are bad people or they are
evil people or they are terrorists or whatever

[01:17:34.546]
or point out some statement they made
in 1982 and say they are anti-Semites

[01:17:38.296]
or they are anti this or they are
anti that, say what do they want?

[01:17:41.516]
By talking to them first of all and
understanding what they want and then saying,

[01:17:45.206]
"Okay, here's 10 things that
they say they want."

[01:17:48.236]
How many of those things are
reasonable and legitimate?

[01:17:50.426]
Is there an international consensus
for what they are asking for

[01:17:53.496]
or are they just outrageously
crazy, violent people?

[01:17:56.576]
I think that kind of exercise is much more
useful to engage them in some kind of process

[01:18:02.316]
that provides for all sides what I said before
-- the application of a single standard of law

[01:18:09.776]
and morality, for Iran, for
Israel, for Hezbollah,

[01:18:13.076]
for Saudi Arabia, for the U.S., for everybody.

[01:18:15.386]
That's a much better way to
try to address the issue than,

[01:18:18.106]
you know, getting armies to attack people.

[01:18:21.176]
And the cost of, of, of regional
warfare now will be much,

[01:18:25.786]
much higher than anything
that we've seen before.

[01:18:28.476]
The Lebanon tribunal issue is a
very significant historical issue.

[01:18:34.146]
It represents the culmination of tensions and
pressures that I believe have been building

[01:18:40.046]
up in the region for a couple of hundred years.

[01:18:43.726]
The -- Hezbollah represents the,
represents the high watermark

[01:18:49.366]
of indigenous Islamic Arab nationalist
resistance to Western intervention

[01:18:55.566]
and the tribunal is a symbolic representation
of a century of Western intervention

[01:19:03.356]
in our region and the two are now clashing.

[01:19:06.846]
The tribunal is a security council.

[01:19:09.006]
Unanimous, legitimate resolution being
implemented to find the killers of Hariri

[01:19:15.356]
and hold them accountable in a fair court and
the majority of Lebanese want that to happen.

[01:19:20.886]
They don't want these killings to go on.

[01:19:23.776]
But there are people who are critical
of what the tribunal is doing.

[01:19:27.416]
Hezbollah and others, they've raised
serious objections so I think it's a --

[01:19:31.916]
you have to separate the political
process from the legal process somehow.

[01:19:36.336]
Holding people accountable to the rule of
law needs to be done but it's got to be done

[01:19:42.016]
on the basis of a convincing
process of investigation,

[01:19:45.486]
production of evidence, and holding a trial.

[01:19:48.126]
There are serious complaints about whether this
process up to now has been fair, transparent,

[01:19:53.246]
and equitable and these complaints
need to be addressed.

[01:19:57.126]
They are serious complaints.

[01:19:59.176]
You can't railroad this tribunal and
just ram it down the throats of people.

[01:20:06.876]
So I think this is a complicated
process that needs

[01:20:10.316]
to be separated from political and legal issues.

[01:20:12.756]
It's also become a symbol of
this wider regional Cold War.

[01:20:17.816]
The Syrians and the, and Hezbollah believe that
the tribunal and the investigation were designed

[01:20:22.916]
from the beginning to, to get
the Syrians and to get Hezbollah

[01:20:27.136]
and therefore they are fighting back.

[01:20:28.476]
So it's extremely complicated,
very delicate moment.

[01:20:31.726]
If it's not handled well, it could lead to
again great problems, fighting in Lebanon

[01:20:36.876]
which might spread to other places.

[01:20:38.566]
The good news is that the Syrians and the
Saudis, the two poles of Arab ideology,

[01:20:44.016]
are working together very closely to
minimize the potential for an explosion.

[01:20:48.986]
They understand how serious
it would be if it happened.

[01:20:51.806]
They are working together very closely to
minimize that and there's active engagement

[01:20:57.296]
with the Iranians and the Lebanese
and the Americans and everybody.

[01:20:59.866]
So it's an extremely complicated situation.

[01:21:03.006]
I believe that they will come
up with a solution that allows

[01:21:07.346]
for a reasonable implementation of justice...

[01:21:11.926]
>> Norman Bishara: Rhami, thank
you so much but we're out of time.

[01:21:13.656]
We appreciate your...

[01:21:14.276]
>> Rhami Khouri: Thank you.

[01:21:15.696]
Thank you very much.

[01:21:17.516]
( Applause - Inaudible )

[01:21:22.480]

[01:21:22.980]